REFLEXIVES IN DISCOURSE

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1. Introduction

Binding theory, a theory of anaphoric relations taken as syntactic dependencies (Chomsky 1981), is one of the central theories in generative grammar:

(1)  
A. An anaphor (= herself) is bound in its governing category  
B. A pronominal (= her) is free in its governing category  
C. An R-expression is free  

The use of the term ‘anaphor’ in (1) is different from its traditional use. In generative grammar the notion ‘anaphor’ is used to refer to reflexive pronouns and reciprocals only. From now on I will use the notion reflexive anaphor to refer to elements such as himself/herself, myself.

Reflexive anaphors being subject to condition A means two things: (i) They are referentially dependent upon a c-commanding Noun Phrase (cf. 2a), and (ii) the antecedent must be found within a certain domain (cf 2b), its governing category:

(2)  
a. - α c-commands β if and only if α does not contain β and the first branching node dominating α also dominates β  
- *[John’s plans] [failed himself]  
b. - β is a governing category for α if and only if β is the minimal category containing α, a governor of α, and a subject (accessible to α)  
- *[John thinks [that Mary hates himself]]

‘Pronominals’ obey condition B of the Binding Theory, which states the reverse from condition A. Whatever the reference of the pronoun may be, one thing is clear, it is not able to take a co-argument for an antecedent. It also means that ‘anaphor resolution’ understood as a notion

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* To write about anaphora in a volume dedicated to Hans den Besten might seem strange. However, Hans was one of the participants of the ‘Jan Vat’ author group responsible for the article ‘Zich and zichzelf’. I take that article, Vat (1980), Everaert (1980, 1981) - in itself the results of unpublished work of Arnold Evers - and the unpublished talk of Riny Huybregts (Huybregts 1979) on this issue as the first comprehensive discussions of the problem of a language having two distinct reflexive anaphors, each having its own distribution. These articles started a whole industry of publications, which, by now, could be taken as a classic ‘case’ in the sense of Everaert & Van Riemsdijk (to appear).

1 I will go one step further and follow Reinhart (1983) in assuming that binding condition B only holds for bound variable interpretation of pronominals. Under coreference, binding condition B may be violated, as the examples in (i) exemplify:

(i) I know what Bill and Mary have in common. Mary adores Bill and Bill adores him too
dealing with the interpretive possibilities of pronouns in discourse is outside the scope of Binding Theory as defined in generative theorising. What is important in the present context is that from the point of view that I have just defined, reflexive anaphors could never be taken as discourse anaphora. There is no a priori reason that this should be the case, but Binding Theory forbids it (cf. Reuland 2000). To put it differently, reflexive anaphors are there for reference in the domain of the clause/sentence. For reference in the domain of discourse, we have pronouns. In this paper I will address the issue to what extent reflexive anaphors could be used for discourse anaphoric purposes.

2. On the Reflexive Anaphor-Pronoun distinction.

Quite soon after the introduction of the Binding theory it was noted that, cross-linguistically, there were many reflexive anaphors with antecedents essentially beyond the regular domain (Thráinsson 1976, Reis 1976, Inoue 1976, Everaert 1980, Yang 1983, Harbert 1983). The examples in (3), Norwegian, Japanese and Icelandic, respectively, illustrate this:

(3)  a. Jon bad oss hjelpe seg
    ‘John asked us to help him’
  b. Bill-wa John-ga zibun-o seme-ta to omot-ta
    Bill John himself blamed that thought
    ‘Bill thought that John blamed him’
  c. Jón segir að Péturi raki sig á hverjum degi
    ‘John says that Peter shaves him every day’

Often such cases were discussed under the heading of Long Distance binding, and were accounted for as the result of relaxations of the notion governing category (for example, Manzini and Wexler 1987) or the reflexive anaphors involved were classified as exceptions, so-called long-distance-anaphors (cf. Anderson 1986, Koster 1987).

Why would the dependency relation between a reflexive anaphor and its antecedent be restricted to the sentential domain? Given a definition of anaphors being referentially defective NPs (Chomsky 1981, Keenan 1988), it is not immediately clear whether, from that point of view, reflexive anaphors could, for instance, never be taken as discourse anaphora:

(4)  *Emma komt thuis. Ik vraag zichzelf of ze honger heeft.
     Emma comes home. I ask herself whether she hunger has
     Emma comes home. I ask her whether she is hungry

However, if the c-command restriction on reflexive anaphora necessarily holds the discourse restriction, exemplified in (4) would follow, because the notion c-command is defined in such a way that it is impossible to define it over discourse.

Reinhart (1983) observes that the reflexive anaphor-antecedent dependency is not the only case where c-command is relevant. It is argued that it also holds for variable binding of pronominal anaphors (he/him), as is exemplified in (5)

(5)  a. Every ex-husband feared that he would be neglected
     b. *Because she hated every ex-husband, Mary would certainly tell Zelda why she left him
     c. *Every ex-husband feared that I would be neglected. He would …
If reflexive anaphors were necessarily interpreted as bound variables, the discourse restrictions on reflexive anaphors (cf. 4) would follow naturally from what explains the (un)grammaticality of the examples in (5).

However, as noted by Ross (1970), Cantrall (1974), Kuno (1987), Zribi-Hertz (1989), Baker (1995) and many others, a variety of contexts in English not only allow its reflexive anaphors to be free in their clause in violation of Condition A (6a-c), but even find their antecedent contextually (6d):

(6) a. Max boasted that the queen invited Lucie and himself for a drink
b. But aside from this, she was keenly conscious of the way in which such an estrangement would react on herself
c. And that was exactly it, he thought. He really didn’t care too much what happened to himself
d. Whom he [Philip] was supposed to be fooling, he couldn’t imagine. Not the twins, surely, because Désirée, in the terrifying way of progressive American parents, believed in treating children like adults and had undoubtedly explained to them the precise nature of her relationship with himself.

How are we to account for these facts? There are at least three positions that are defended in the literature (for English, but, by and large, these approaches can also be found for other languages).

(i) The first option is that we reject the standard Binding Theory. Such examples as in (6) have been used to argue for discourse theoretic concepts such as ‘point of view’ or Gricean principles to be the relevant notion for anaphoric binding. This has led to proposals where the empirical domain of the binding theory is relegated to the domain of discourse principles, i.e. non-syntax (cf. Kuno 1987, Zribi Hertz 1989, Levinson 1987/1991), Y. Huang 1994, among others). In other words, the principles governing the anaphoric dependencies exemplified in (6) are not part of syntax. As soon as we do that, reflexive anaphors are expected to extend their use in the domain of discourse.

(ii) The facts in (6) might call into question whether English himself in these cases really is reflexive anaphor. This statement can take two forms. We can assume that there is one lexical category, but that given certain configurational (or other) factors that element is either interpreted as reflexive anaphor or as something else (cf. Bouchard 1984, Huang 1982). The same type of approach has been suggested for pronouns that seem to act as reflexive anaphors (cf. Ronat 1982 for French; Everaert 1986 for Flemish Dutch and Frisian).

In the case of English we know that the lexical element indicated as the reflexive anaphor is also used as an emphatic pronoun. Baker (1995) proposes that there should be a distinction between himself as a reflexive anaphor and himself in a non-anaphoric intensive use. The latter would be generated as an empty pronominal with an emphatic pronoun. So what may look like a reflexive anaphor is in fact the combination of an unlexicalized pronoun and an emphatic pronoun. Jayaseelan (1995) proposes a similar line of argumentation. (cf. also Bickerton 1987, Koenig & Siemund 2000).

(iii) The last option I want to discuss is the position that there is only one type of lexical element, that is a reflexive anaphor, but that under certain circumstances this element is subject to the Binding Theory, and in other cases it is subject to some other interpretative principle. Thráinsson (1976, 1979) was probably the first to suggest that there might be two
systems of reflexive interpretation. He argued that Icelandic had a non clause-bounded rule for cases like (7a), which is sensitive to semantic factors that do not seem to play any role in ‘normal’ reflexivization, as in (7b):2

(7) a. Jón segir að Pétur raki sig/hann á hverjum degi
   ‘John says that Peter shave-subj himself every day’
   John says that Peter shaves him every day
b. Jón skipaði Pétur að PROi raka sig/*hann hverjum degi
   ‘John ordered Peter to shave-inf’ himself every day
   John ordered Peter to shave him every day

More recently this position is further developed by Pollard & Sag (1994) and Reinhart & Reuland (1991; 1993). They argue that reflexive anaphors in argument position are subject to a syntactic binding theory (cf. (1)), and reflexive anaphors in non-argument positions are not. In the latter case discourse interpretation of reflexive anaphors is an option.3

The last type of approach, the Binding Theory as outlined in the Reflexivity framework of Reinhart & Reuland, I will briefly discuss in section 3, and explain what the consequences are for our discussion of reflexive anaphors as discourse anaphora.

3. Reflexivity

In the Reflexivity framework, the distribution of reflexive anaphors is regulated by the binding conditions, as they are formulated in (8). The definitions of reflexive and reflexive-marked are given in (9):4

(8) a. A reflexive-marked syntactic predicate is reflexive
b. A reflexive semantic predicate is reflexive-marked
(9) a. A predicate is reflexive iff two of its arguments are coindexed
b. A predicate (of P) is reflexive-marked iff either (i) P is lexically reflexive or (ii) one of P’s arguments is a SELF-anaphor

In addition there is a separate condition on reflexive anaphors, the chain formation condition - linking binding to the movement module. In Reinhart & Reuland’s view, every lexical element, overt or empty, is subject to A-chain formation under the conditions set out in (10).

2 Observe that in both cases binding of the reflexive anaphor is non-local but regular complementarity, predicted by the Binding theory, is observed in (7b) but not in (7a) (Cf. Everaert 1986 for an attempt to give a unified account for these facts).

3 For Reinhart and Reuland such anaphors are called ‘logophors’. Pollard and Sag use the term ‘exempt anaphors’ to reflect that they are exempt from the core binding principles.

4 To be complete, the notions syntactic/semantic predicate are defined as in (i):
   (i) a. The syntactic predicate formed of (a head) P is P, all its syntactic arguments and an external argument of P (subject)
       The syntactic arguments of P are the projections assigned Θ-role or Case by P
       b. The semantic predicate formed of P is P and all its arguments at the relevant semantic level
(10) a. **Condition on A-chains:** A maximal A-chain \((\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)\) contains exactly one link - \(\alpha_1\) - which is +R.
   
   b. An NP is +R iff it carries full specification for phi-features and structural Case.

Let me illustrate how these rules/principles work with the help of the examples in (11-12). The distributional difference between pronouns and reflexives in (11) follows from the fact that English *himself* is a SELF-anaphor, and *him* not.

(11) a. *John* washed *himself*
   b. *John* washed *him*

In the same way, the difference between Dutch *zich* and *zichzelf* in (12) follows from the assumption that the latter is a SELF-anaphor, and the former not:

(12) a. *Marie* houdt niet van *zichzelf*
   b. *Marie* houdt niet van *zich*
      Mary loves not of herself (self)
      ‘Mary doesn’t love herself’
   c. *Zichzelf* houdt niet van *Marie*

The difference between English *him* (11b) and Dutch *zich* (12b) is that the latter is a reflexive anaphor, and not a pronominal. In (12a,c) the predicates are both reflexive and reflexive-marked satisfying (8). The ungrammaticality of (12c) is due to a violation of the Condition on A-chains (10): the head of the chain is -R since the Dutch reflexive anaphor *zich* is not fully specified for phi-features.

It is important to observe that the conditions/principles (8, 10) on anaphoric dependencies are not applicable in cases like (13); the two co-indexed elements are not co-arguments in the sense defined by the definitions in (9), and footnote 6:

(13) *Mary* saw a picture of *herself*
    This picture of *himself* pleased *John*

I will return to the behaviour of such reflexives in sections 4, 5 and 6.

One important aspect of Reinhart & Reuand’s approach is their typology of anaphoric elements. They assume that NPs are partitioned according to the properties \([\pm \text{SELF}], [\pm \text{R}]\). As explained in Anagnostopoulou & Everaert (1999) this gives a typology as in (14):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SELF</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>pronoun/ R-expression</th>
<th>Inalienable possession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refl. Function</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-specification</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>himself</em></td>
<td><em>zich</em></td>
<td><em>him/hem</em></td>
<td><em>o eaftos tu</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is crucial to understand that in this approach there is no simple notion ‘reflexive anaphor’ any more. There is a typology of expressions, which could be classified as ‘reflexive anaphors’, and as the discussion in Anagnostopoulou & Everaert (1999) for Greek, Amiridze (1998) for Georgian, and Lidz (1995) for Kannada have shown, these reflexive anaphors have a different distribution. On the basis of (8-10) and (14), and some additional assumptions, we are able to
account for such diverse facts as given in (11-12) and (15), examples from Greek, Frisian and Kannada, respectively:

(15) a. O eaftos tu tu aresi tu Petru
[The self his]NOM ClDAt like3SG the PeterDAt
‘Peter is pleased by himself’

b. George vasket him/himself
‘George washes him/himself’

c. Raama tann-annu/avan-ann-ee hogaLi-koNDanu
Ram selfACC /heACC praisedREFL-AGR
‘Ram praised himself’

I hope that it is clear that what I have discussed just now is only the beginning of a much more intricate binding theory than the original Binding Theory of Chomsky (1981). It will be a system consisting of severally distinct strategies establishing anaphoric dependencies (cf. 16), partly depending on a much more elaborate classification of ‘reflexive anaphors’ (cf. 17) (Dimitriados & Everaert to appear):

(16) Anaphoric Strategies
a. Reflexive marking
b. Chain formation
c. Logophoric interpretation

(17) Anaphor types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal pronouns:</th>
<th>Dutch/German 1st/2nd person (me/je), (mich/dich), Frisian (him)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective pronoun + body noun/self</td>
<td>Saramaccan (en sikin), English (himself)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underspecified reflexive clitic</td>
<td>French (se), Italian (si)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underspecified reflexive pronoun, phonologically weak</td>
<td>Dutch (zich), Norwegian (seg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underspecified reflexive pronoun + intensifier</td>
<td>French (se), Italian (si)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possessive pronoun + body noun/self</td>
<td>Papiamentu. (su kurpa ‘his body’), Georgian 1st/2nd person (shen tav ‘your self’), English 1st/2nd person (myself/yourself)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possessive body noun/self + body noun/self</td>
<td>Georgian 3rd person (tavis tav ‘self’ s self’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determiner + possessive + noun</td>
<td>Greek (o eaftos mu ‘the self my’)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the local, predicate domain reflexive marking (16a) and chain formation (16b) take precedence. Outside the predicate domain, the use of a reflexive anaphor is, in principle, possible, but it will be a case of discourse binding, logophoric binding (16c), i.e. binding not subject to the syntactic restrictions formulated in (16a,b).

Below we will focus on the issue of ‘reflexive’ binding outside the predicate domain. I will address the following two issues:

(i) Is there a relation between the type of reflexive anaphor (cf. 17) and its function as logophor? Could it be the case that the type of reflexive anaphor determines whether or not discourse binding is allowed? In section 4 I will make some very preliminary remarks.
(ii) Is there any function that is cross-linguistically not available for elements that we would call a reflexive? More specifically I want to look into the question whether reflexives, or what appear to be reflexives, can be used deictically. In section 5 I will explore this issue.

(iii) Do we need more than the reflexive anaphor-pronoun dichotomy to describe the anaphoric properties of certain reflexive-like elements? In section 6 this issue is discussed.

Sections 4, 5 and 6 will make clear that the anaphor-pronoun distinction of the Binding Theory is not straightforward, and that, perhaps, a finer distinction than the anaphor-pronoun dichotomy is needed (Everaert 2003).

4. Reflexive anaphor types and their discourse uses

4.1 SE-reflexive anaphors

Dutch zich, German sich, Norwegian seg are well-known examples of reflexive anaphors defying the binding conditions as formulated in (1), allowing non-local binding (Reis 1976, Hellan 1975, Everaert 1980):

\[(18) \quad \text{a. } \text{Jan hoorde mij over zich praten} \]
\[\text{John heard me about himself talk} \]
\[\text{b. } \text{Jon hørte meg snakke om seg} \]
\[\text{Jon heard me talk about himself} \]
\[\text{c. } \text{Johan hörte mich über sich reden} \]
\[\text{Johan heard me about himself talk} \]
\[\text{‘John heard me talk about him’} \]

This type of non-local binding, medium distance binding in the terminology of Koster & Reuland (1991), however, is basically limited to verbal small clause predicates. The examples in (19), from Icelandic, illustrate another type of non-local binding, long distance binding in the terminology of Koster & Reuland (1991):

\[(19) \quad \text{a. } \text{[ Skoðun Jóns ] er [að þu hafir svikíð sig ] og það er skoðun Péturs líka} \]
\[\text{Opinion John’s is that you have betrayed himself and that is opinion Peter’s too} \]
\[\text{‘John’s opinion is that you have betrayed him and that is Peter’s opinion too’} \]
\[\text{b. } \text{Formaðurinn varð óskaplega reiður. Tillagan væri svívirileg og væri henni beint gegn sér persónulega. Sér væri reyndar sama ...} \]
\[\text{The chairman became furiously angry. The proposal was outrageous and it aimed against himself personally. Himself was in fact indifferent [...]} \]
\[\text{‘The chairman became very angry. The proposal was outrageous, and it was aimed against him personally. In fact, he did not care [...]’} \]
\[\text{c. } \text{María var alltaf svo andstyggileg. Þegar Ölafurj kæmi segði hún sér áreiðanlega að fara. …} \]
\[\text{Mary was always so nasty. When Olaf would come, she would certainly tell himself [the person whose thoughts are being presented - not Olaf] to leave} \]

It has been argued that in such cases the discourse notion point of view plays an important role, i.e. the reflexive anaphor refers to an antecedent ‘whose speech, thoughts, feelings, or general
status of consciousness are reported’ (Clements 1975:141). Whatever the precise discourse factors are, it is clear that such examples violate the binding conditions, both in the GB-version (cf. 1), as in the Reflexivity version (cf. 8).

On the basis of the examples in (18-19) one might hypothesize that SE-reflexives, i.e. featurally underspecified reflexive elements (cf. 17), are well-suited for non-local binding. However, that this is not the case is, for instance, illustrated by (20) and (21). Icelandic allows non-local binding in subjunctive complements, German does not (cf 20); Norwegian allows non-local binding in infinitival complements, Dutch does not (cf. 21).

(20) a. Jón segir að María elska sig/*sig sjalfan
   Jon says that Maria lovesSUBJ himself
   (Jon says that Maria loves him)
   b. *Er hoffte dass ich für sich arbeiten würde
   He hoped that I for himself would work

(21) a. Jon bad oss hjelpe seg/*seg selv
   Jon asked us help himself
   ‘Jon asked us to help him’
   c. *Hij vroeg mij iets voor zich te kopen
   He asked me something for himself to buy

The examples below also make clear that Norwegian (22a) and Dutch (22b) SE-reflexives occupying a ‘non-argument’ position, i.e. in a position where the reflexivity binding conditions are not applicable (cf. 13), do not allow logophoric binding, contrary to the English reflexive anaphor (22c).

(22) a. *De undrede hvorfor bildet of seg var solgt
   They wonder why the picture of themselves was sold
   b. *Zij vragen zich af waarom de foto van zich was verkocht
   They wonder themselves why the picture of themselves was sold

5 Observe that subjunctive marking, related to the notion point of view, is a necessary condition for long distance binding in Icelandic (Thráinsson 1979). In some cases the semantic requirements for logophoric binding are met but still binding is excluded, because the subjunctive marking is not there:

(i) a. Jón segir að petta sé stúlkan sem elski sig
   John says that this iSUBJ the girl that lovesSUBJ himself
   b. *Jón segir að petta sé stúlkan sem elskar sig
      John says that this iSUBJ the girl that lovesIND himself

In other cases the semantic constraint is met, and the subjunctive is overtly marked, but the constraint that the antecedent of sig must be a subject is violated, leading to a diminished grammaticality (cf. (ii)).

(ii) ??Ég heyr ráð fól幕 frá Jóni að María hefði kysst sig
    I heard from John that Maria hasSUBJ kissed himself

The conclusion that I draw from this is that, despite appearances, syntactic constraints still play a role in Icelandic long-distance binding.

6 A similar contrast holds for French: soi be long-distance bound, but se not (cf. Pica 1985), although are SE-reflexives (Cf. Everaert 1991 for an explanation):

(i) a. On ne doit pas dire aux gens de parler de soi
   One not should say to people to talk about oneself
   ‘One shouldn’t tell people to speak about one’
   b. *On ne doit pas dire aux gens de se donner de l’argent
      One not should say to people to oneself give money
c. (?)They wonder why the picture of themselves was sold

Now take a look at the following examples of Dutch zich/zichzelf:

(23)  a. Die uitspraken over *?zich/?zichzelf hebben hem een slechte naam bezorgd
      Those statements about himself have him a bad name given
      ‘Those statements about himself have given him a bad name’

     b. Die uitspraken over *?zich/?zichzelf hadden tot gevolg dat er een artikel verscheen
        waarin hij belachelijk werd gemaakt
        Those statements about himself had as a consequence that there an article appeared
        in which he ridiculous was made
        ‘Those statements about himself resulted in a newspaper article in which he was
        ridiculized’

     c. *Er is een artikel over hem verschenen in de krant. Die uitspraken over zich/zichzelf
        stonden op de voorpagina.
        There has an article about him appeared in the newspaper. Those statements about
        himself stood on the front page.
        ‘A newspaper article about him appeared. Those statements about himself stood
        on the front page’

As these examples make clear, Dutch zichzelf seems to allow non-local binding (marginally)
from a non-argument position, contrary to Dutch zich, but in both cases discourse binding is
definitely excluded (23c).

The overall conclusion is: SE-reflexives are not generally well-suited for non-local, discourse
binding. Everaert (1986, 2001) offers explanations for why Dutch, German, Norwegian SE-
reflexives only have limited non-local binding possibilities, contrary to Icelandic SE-reflexives.
Reuland (2001) gives an explanation for the fact that subjunctive marking marking in
Icelandic, but not in German, triggers non-local binding.

4.2 Inalienable possession reflexives: the case of Greek

As we discussed above, some languages take inalienable possession construction NPs as
reflexive anaphors. Greek is such a case, having the inalienable possession reflexive
anaphor o eaftos to (cf. 17). Given the fact that inalienable possession constructions (John
raised his eyebrows) are strictly clause-bound, one might expect inalienable possession
reflexives to be strict locally bound reflexive anaphors. Greek, however, offers us a
somewhat mixed picture.

Take (24), a case of a locative PP. Here o eaftos tu is excluded. This could be taken as an
indication that the Greek reflexive anaphor is an obligatory reflexivizer, requiring a co-
argument antecedent, that is not available in (24a,b):

(24)  a. *O Petros idhe ena fidi dipla ston eafto tu
      The Peter saw a snake next to the self his

     b. *O Giannis lei oti o Petros kpirizi ton eafto tu kathe mera
      ‘John says that Peter shaves himself every day’

Like English himself, Greek o eaftos tu is allowed in picture-NP’s configurations such as in
(25):
(25) Merikes fotograpies tu eafiu tu den tu aresun tu Petru katholu
Some pictures the self his not Cl_{GEN} please the Peter_{GEN} at all
‘Some pictures of himself do not appeal to Peter at all’

One would then expect that o eafios tu is also allowed in other ‘logophoric’ configurations, such as (26a,b), but these are generally judged ungrammatical ((26b) slightly better than (26a), just as in English):

(26) a. *I vasilisa kalese ton eafto mu gia dipno
   The queen invited the self my for dinner
   ‘The queen invited myself for dinner’

b. ?*I vasilisa kalese ton Petro ke ton eafto mu gia dipno
   The queen invited the Peter_{ACC} and the self_{ACC} my for dinner
   ‘The queen invited Peter and myself for dinner’

Finally, consider (27):

(27) a. (?)Kai itan akrivos afto, (aftos) skeftike. Pragmatika den ton eniaze ke poli,
   And was exactly that, pro (he) thought. Indeed not Cl_{ACC} mattered and much,
   ti siveni ston eafto tu
   what happened to-the self his
   ‘And that was exactly it, he thought. Indeed it didn’t matter to him what happened to himself.’

b. *I Maria itan panta toso ka kotropi. Kathe fora pu erxotan o Giannis
   The Mary was always so ill-mannered. Every time that came the Giannis
   ekini elege ston eafto tu na figi.
   she said to the self his to go
   ‘Mary was always so nasty. Every time Giannis would come, she would tell him to leave.’

Apparently, discourse binding is acceptable in (27a). This sentence contains an experiencer object construction where the experiencer is an accusative clitic and the subject is the indirect question. However, (27b) is excluded.

So, in the case of Greek we get a mixed picture. It has a distribution that is wider than one would expect if it were a reflexivizing reflexive anaphor, but it is much more limited than its Icelandic equivalent.

5. Deictic use of anaphora: the case of Japanese, English and Turkish

It has been noted that in various languages reflexives are used as honorifics. Siewierska (to appear: 224-228) has an intriguing section on this particular, deictic, use of reflexives. Let me give a few examples, basing myself on Siewierska’s work.

In Kannada the reflexive taavu (in the plural) can be used as a second person ultra-honorific:

(i) taavu ii kaDe banni
    self this side comeH
    ‘Please come to this side.’

In Kashmiri it is possible to express politeness by using the simple reflexive pani as a second person honorific:

(ii) pa:nas si:th\' di me pakh\'
    self_{INT} with allow me walk
5.1 Japanese

The fact that the Japanese reflexive element *zibun* allows discourse binding is well-known from the literature (Iida 1996, a.o). The following example from Hara (2002) illustrates this:

(28) Watasi-no *tizin*-wa, kuruma-de kodomo-o hii-ta.
    ‘An acquaintance of mine ran over a child by (his) car’

Kare-wa, kyun-ni tobidasi-te-ki-ta hoo-ga waru-i. Kodomo-o yoku situke-te-i-na-kat-ta oya-ga waru-i-to it-te-i-ta.
    ‘He was saying, “The one who came running out suddenly was to blame.”’

Tokoroga, sono go *zibun*-no kodomo-ga kuruma-ni hik-are-te sin-da.
    ‘But after that his child was run over by a car and died’

Hara (2002) argues that *zibun* is a high accessibility marker (in the sense of Ariel 1990): “Thus when the speaker uses *zibun*, he signals to the addressee to search for a highly accessible antecedent.” In such a view *zibun* does not necessarily need a sentence internal antecedent. And, in fact, it has been observed that the reflexive anaphor *zibun* in cases like (29a,b) can even be used deictically, i.e. the referent of *zibun* is the speaker or the addressee:

(29) a. Hirosi ga ima gesyuku site iru ie ni zibun wa moo gonen mo sunde iru.
    ‘I have been living as long as five years in the house where Hiroshi boards now’

b. Taroo ga kai ni der-are-nakat-ta no de zibun wa Ziroo o kawari ni yat-ta
    ‘As Taro could not go to the meeting, I sent Jiro to his place’

According to some, this use of *zibun*, is restricted to certain dialects (Inoue 1976), or to certain registers, a very special class of male people, such as military people (cf. Akatsuka 1976: 58, Inoue 1976: 119). Hara (2002) seems to suggest that this use of *zibun* is more generally available. He argues that in examples as in (30) it is possible that *zibun* refers to the subject, but that the preferred interpretation is the one where *zibun* refers to the speaker.

(30) a. *Daremo-i*-ga *zibun*-speaker=i-o tunet-ta
    ‘Everyone pinched me’ > ‘Everyone pinched himself’

b. *Daremo-i*-ga *zibun*-speaker=i-o nikun-de-i-ru
    ‘Everyone hates me.’ > ‘Everyone hates himself’

However, observe that in these cases of deictic use (29,30), reference is limited to speaker or addressee. Reference to someone other than speaker or addressee is not allowed. In other words, *zibun, zibun-tachi* are not regular pronouns. So, sentences like (31), from Okamoto (2001), used in the appropriate context cannot mean (i) but only (ii):

(31) a. *Zibun*-ga asagohan-wo tabeta
    (i) ≠ ‘He ate breakfast’

   (ii) ‘Allow me to go with you.’

Such usage is also attested in Turkish, and Hungarian. In Turkish the reflexive *kendi*, appended with the third person *si* is used as a third person singular and plural honorific.

(iii) *kendi*-siopera-ya git-ti
    self3sg operaDAT goPAST
    ‘He (respectful) has gone to the opera.'
(ii) ‘I ate breakfast’

b. Zibun-tachi-ga asagohan-wo tabeta

(i) ≠ ‘They ate breakfast’

(ii) ‘We ate breakfast’

5.2 English

The case of English is, to a certain extent, comparable to that of Japanese. Take a look at the examples in (32), from Ross (1970):

(32) a. There were five tourists in the room apart from myself
    b. Physicists like yourself are a godsend

A first and second person reflexive can be used directly referring to the participants in a discourse. The only restriction that seems to hold is that third person reflexives cannot be used deictically (cf. (33):

(33) a. *There were five tourists in the room apart from themselves
    b. *Physicists like himself are a godsend
    c. *I thought that Mary and himself were leaving.

Miller (1993) notes that in Scottish English myself is used where standard English uses I/me, i.e. the use of a reflexive form is even more wide-spread:

(34) a. There wasn’t one policeman on duty at the time and if it hadn’t been for myself, no evidence either.
    b. Myself and Andy changed and ran onto the pitch

But still the 3rd person reflexive is not used in these contexts. However, Keenan (1988), Harris (1993) observe that in Irish English the argumental self-form can be used deictically:

(35) a. Herself will tell you
    b. Did you see himself?

Harris describes this use as: “Typically, the reference in such cases is implicit. That is, rather than the person being mentioned explicitly in the immediate linguistic context (for instance, in a preceding sentence), the reference draws on the shared knowledge of the speaker and hearer. Note that in each of the following sentences there is no noun phrase with which the self-pronoun can be construed.”

5.3 Turkish

Kornfilt (2001) gives a thorough description of the distribution of the Turkish ‘reflexives’ kendı and kendisin. It turns out that in many environments kendı (self) and kendisin (self-his) are interchangeable, as is illustrated in, for instance, (36):

(36) a. Ahmet kendin-i çok beğen-iyor-mus
    Ahmet self,ACC very admirePROGR-REP.PAST
    *(They say that) Ahmet admires himself very much’
    b. Ahmet kendi-sin-i çok beğen-iyor-mus
    Ahmet self,3SG-ACC very admirePROGR-REP.PAST
‘(They say that) Ahmet admires himself very much’

However, there is one important difference. *Kendisin* can be used deictically, *kendi* not:

(37)  
(a) *Ali hakkında Ahmet ne düşünüyör?*  
Ali about Ahmet what think-Progr.  
‘What does Ahmet think of Ali?’

(b) Ahmet *kendi-sin-i çok beğen -iyor -mus*  
‘(They say that) Ahmet admires him (=Ali) very much’

(c) *Ahmet kendin-i çok beğen -iyor -mus*  
‘(They say that) Ahmet admires him (=Ali) very much’

Moreover *kendisin*, but not *kendi*, allows split antecedents. In other words, *kendi* seems to behave like a proper reflexive anaphor, while *kendisin* shows pronominal-like behaviour, except that it can be locally bound (36b).\(^8\) Kornfilt (2001) offers an interesting hypothesis why this would be the case.

### 6 In-between reflexive anaphors and pronouns: the case of Tamil and Dutch

#### 6.1 Tamil (Lehmann 1989, Annamalai 2000)

Tamil has two pronouns referring to 3\(^{rd}\) person antecedents: *avan* (that one, he; 3\(^{rd}\) Person, Masculine, Accusative, -Proximate) and *ivan* (this one, he; 3\(^{rd}\) Person, Masculine, Accusative, +Proximate). In addition Tamil has a pronominal form *taan* (3\(^{rd}\) Person, -Plural, not specified for gender), which could be taken as the equivalent of English *himself*. (38-39) illustrates the binding properties of *taan*: *taan* cannot be discourse bound (cf 38), but intrasentential reference is not restricted to the local domain (cf. 39a,b).

(38)  
(a) *kamalaa avan tann-ai veru-kkir-aan en-ru ninai-tt-aa*  
Kamala he self\(^{ACC}\) hate\(^{PRES-3SG.M}\) say\(^{VBP}\) think\(^{PST-3SG.F}\)  
‘Kamala thought that he hated him (=Kumaar)’

(b) *kumaar kaDekki poonan; ange tanakkku oNNum piDikkale*  
Kumar shop to go\(^{PST.AGR}\) there self to anything like not  
‘Kumar went to the shop; he did not like anything there.’

(39)  
(a) kamalaa avan tann-ai veru-kkir-aan en-ru ninai-tt-aa  
Kamala he self\(^{ACC}\) hate\(^{PRES-3SG.M}\) say\(^{VBP}\) think\(^{PST-3SG.F}\)  
‘Kamala thought that he hated himself’

(b) *kamalaa avan tann-ai veru-kkir-aan en-ru ninai-tt-aa*  
Kamala he she\(^{ACC}\) hate\(^{PRES-3SG.M}\) say\(^{VBP}\) think\(^{PST-3SG.F}\)  
‘Kamala thought that he hated her’

In Lehmann (1989) *taan* is described as a 4\(^{th}\) person pronoun: “the occurrence of *taan* in a reflexive construction is only one of its occurrences and there is, therefore, no justification to call it a reflexive pronoun […] just because it can occur in a reflexive construction.” (p.97)

In other words, because *taan* is not limited to the smallest domain (39a), but is regularly

\(^8\) Curiously enough, it is precisely the bare reflexive anaphor that has been borrowed by related languages, such as the Urfà dialect of Syrian Christians and the Turkish dialect of Cyprus, to be used as a pronoun (Csató 2002).
used in a wider domain (39b), Lehmann does not want to call it a reflexive, contrary to Annamalai (2000). The pronoun *avan* is the designated element for discourse binding (cf. 40a); local binding is excluded (40b), unless modified by an emphasis marker (40c):

(40) a. *kumaar* kaDekki poonan; ange *avanukku* oNNum piDikkale
   Kumar shop to go<sub>PST.AGR</sub> there he to anything like not
   ‘Kumar went to the shop; he did not like anything there.’

b. *kumaar avan-ai* veru-kkir-aan
   Kumar he<sub>ACC</sub> hate<sub>PRES-3SGM</sub>
   Kumar hates himself

c. *kumaar avaneyee* verukaan
   Kumar he<sub>ACC.EMPH</sub> hate<sub>PST.AGR</sub>
   ‘Kumar hates himself’

The differences/similarities between the proximate/obviative pronouns becomes clear in (41-42). (41) shows that both pronouns can be used deictically, but that for sentence internal reference *ivan*, the proximate element, is excluded:

(41) a. *ivan* en tampi
   (this)-he I<sub>OBL</sub> brother
   ‘He is my brother’

b. *avan* en tampi
   (that)-he I<sub>OBL</sub> brother
   ‘He is my brother’

(42) a. *kumaar va-nt-aal naan avan-iTam* collu-v-een
   Kumar come<sub>COND</sub> I he<sub>LOC</sub> say<sub>FUT-1SG</sub>
   ‘If Kumar comes I will tell him’

b. *kumaar va-nt-aal naan ivan-iTam* collu-v-een
   Kumar come<sub>COND</sub> I he<sub>LOC</sub> say<sub>FUT-1SG</sub>
   ‘If Kumar comes I will tell him’

Summarizing we can say that *taan* is an element that is used for sentence internal reference, if c-commanded by its antecedent, (cf 38; 39); *ivan* is used for deictic contexts only (41a; 42b); *avan* can be used for deixis, discourse binding and sentence internal binding (40a,c; 41b; 42a).

### 6.2 Dutch

As discussed in chapter 3, the partitioning of anaphoric elements in Dutch is not much different from English. Pronouns are used for deixis, discourse binding and sentence-internal binding. Dutch has, contrary to English, two reflexive forms, *zich* and *zichzelf*, but both are, despite their distributional differences, limited to the predicational domain (cf. 23b,c). It is important to note that neither of these reflexives, contrary to the English reflexive anaphor (cf 5,6), allows discourse binding (even though they vacuously satisfy the reflexivity binding conditions, being in logophoric contexts):

However, there is a pronominal form - pronoun + *zelf* - that, at face value, would not be considered a reflexive anaphor, but that seems to behave as a discourse anaphoric element, like English *himself* (De Vries 1999). In Anagnostopoulou & Everaert (1999) it is

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9 Following Everaert (1986) we take *hemzelf*, just as *zichzelf*, to be build up as the combination of a pronoun and a focussing particle:
argued that, in Reflexivity terms, the feature specification of hemzelf is [+SELF,+R]. If this is the case, we rightly predict the examples in (43a,b) to be ungrammatical because of chain formation violations (cf. 10); example (43c) is predicted to be grammatical:

(43) a. *Jan zag hemzelf
   John saw him himself
b. *Jan schoot op hemzelf
   John shot at him himself
c. Zij dachten dat er over hemzelf gepraat werd
   They thought that there about them themselves talked was
   ‘They thought that people were talking about them’

Anagnostopoulou & Everaert (1999) argue that anaphoric expressions like hemzelf are expected to be well-formed in logophoric contexts. The examples in (44), from Van der Leek (1980), illustrate this:

(44) a. Zij praatten met Bob over hemzelf
   They talked to Bob about him self
   ‘They talked to Bob about himself’
b. Die beschrijving van hemzelf als communist ergerde De Gaulle
   That description of him self as communist annoyed De Gaulle
   ‘That description of himself as a communist annoyed De Gaulle’
c. Er werd de koningin een portret van haarzelf aangeboden
   There was the queen a portret of her self presented
   ‘The queen was presented with a picture of herself.’

These [+SELF,+R] anaphors are not excluded by the Condition on Chain Formation (10) for the simple reason that there is no chain formation, and, furthermore, the Reflexivity Conditions (8) are vacuously satisfied.

Since judgements on this point are not always clear we have done some corpus research. On the basis of a 5 million word corpus (INL, 5 million word corpus, 1994), looking only for hemzelf (i.e. 3rd person male, singular) we found 259 instances, two of them given in (45):

(45) a. Volgens Minister Ritzen was dat rapport voor hemzelf bedoeld en niet voor de openbaarheid.
   ‘According to minister Ritzen the white paper was meant for him, and was not to be published’
   ‘[So] Martin will need new feet. A very nice and positive dream. An aid for him and his parents.

There is no contrastive stress in these cases. However, there seems to be a prominence constraint: the antecedent is the most prominent nominal in relation to hemzelf. In examples like (46, 47) this point of view condition is violated:

(46) a. Wat vindt Karel van Piet?

(i)  [DP [DP pronoun] [O zelf] ]
‘What does Karel think of Piet?’

b. Karel bewondert hem/*hems zelf zeer.

‘Karel admires him/him himself very much’

(47) a. Jan sprak over mij en Marie sprak over hem/*hems zelf

‘John talked about me and Marie talk about him/him himself’

b. Jan sprak over mij en Marie sprak over de taak die hem/*hems zelf was toegewezen

‘John talked about me and Marie talked about the task that was appointed to him/him himself’

Summarizing Dutch one can conclude: the reflexive anaphors zich/zich zelf are limited to the local, mainly predicational domain; pronouns are allowed in all other domains and hem zelf is excluded in the predicational domain and in deictic use.

7. Conclusion

The Binding Theory of Chomsky (1981) can be characterised as a theory of interpretative dependencies (i) taken as syntactic dependencies sensitive to structural restrictions (such as c-command) (ii) based on a central anaphor-pronoun dichotomy. Reflexive anaphors are there for reference in the domain of the clause/sentence, for reference in the domain of discourse, we have pronouns. The Reflexivity Framework of Reinhart and Reuland (1993), discussed in section 3, departs from some of the core features of BT since it (i) limits regular binding to the predicational domain. (ii) assumes a much more elaborate classification of reflexive elements, (iii) allows several distinct ways of licensing anaphoric dependencies. Sections 4-6 illustrate that there are different types of elements that could be called reflexives, or have a reflexivizing effect. Section 4 discusses whether certain reflexive anaphor can be bound in discourse given their morpho-syntactic properties. Section 5 discusses the issue to what extent reflexive anaphors could be used for discourse anaphoric purposes. In Section 6, the anaphor-pronoun distinction of the standard binding theory is discussed.

On the basis a very preliminary discussion of facts from Japanese, dialects of English, Tamil and Dutch we conclude that a finer distinction than the anaphor-pronoun dichotomy of the binding theory is needed. There are reflexive elements restricted to the predicational domain, reflexive elements that are allowed sentence internally, including the predicational domain, such as Tamil taan, and reflexive elements that seem to be used in the discourse domain, including sentence-internal use, such as English reflexive himself and Japanese zibun. Generally pronouns are taken to be elements that can be used in any domain, with the exception of the predicational domain. The Turkish reflexive anaphor kendisin seems to be an exception. We have argued that the distribution of Dutch hem zelf, which we would initially consider a pronoun, is somewhat more restricted in that deictic use seems not to be allowed.

Clearly, further study should make clear whether these preliminary conclusions can be upheld

References


Okamoto, Y. (2001) Zibun is complex, ms University of Maryland