Opposition to The New Jersey Plan (June 19)
Much stress had been laid by some gentlemen
on the want of power in the Convention to propose any other
than a federal plan. To what had been answered by others, he
would only add, that neither of the characteristics attached to a
federal plan would support this objection. One characteristic,
was that in a federal Government, the power was exercised not
on the people individually, but on the people collectively, on the
States. Yet in some instances as in piracies, captures etc. the
existing Confederacy, and in many instances, the amendments to
it proposed by Mr. Paterson, must operate immediately on individuals. The other characteristic was that a federal Government
derived its appointments not immediately from the people, but
from the States which they respectively composed. Here too
were facts on the other side. In two of the States, Connecticut
and Rhode Island, the delegates to Congress were chosen, not by
the Legislatures, but by the people at large, and the plan of
Mr. Paterson intended no change in this particular.
It had been alleged, by Mr. Paterson, that the Confederation having been formed by unanimous consent, could be dissolved by unanimous Consent only. Does this doctrine result
from the nature of compacts. Does it arise from any particular
stipulation in the articles of Confederation. If we consider the
federal union as analagous to the fundamental compact by which
individuals compose one Society, and which must in its theoretic
origin at least, have been the unanimous act of the component
members, it can not be said that no dissolution of the compact
can be effected without unanimous consent. A breach of the
fundamental principles of the compact by a part of the Society
would certainly absolve the other part from their obligations to
it. If the breach of any article by any of the parties, does not set
the others at liberty, it is because, the contrary is implied in the
compact itself, and particularly by that law of it, which gives an
indefinite authority to the majority to bind the whole in all cases.
This latter circumstance shows that we are not to consider the
federal Union as analagous to the social compact of individuals, for if it were so, a Majority would have a right to bind the
rest, and even to form a new Constitution for the whole, which
the Gentleman from New Jersey would be among the last to
admit. If we consider the federal Union as analogous not to the
social compacts among individual men, but to the conventions
among individual States. What is the doctrine resulting from
these conventions. Clearly, according to the Expositors of the
law of Nations, that a breach of any one article, by any one
party, leaves all the other parties at liberty, to consider the whole
convention as dissolved, unless they choose rather to compel the
delinquent party to repair the breach. In some treaties indeed it is
expressly stipulated that a violation of particular articles shall not
have this consequence, and even that particular articles shall
remain in force during war, which in general is understood to
dissolve all subsisting Treaties. But are there any exceptions of
this sort to the Articles of confederation. So far from it that there
is not even an express stipulation that force shall be used to
compell an offending member of the Union to discharge its duty,
He observed that the violations of the federal articles had been
numerous and notorious. Among the most notorious was an act
of New Jersey herself, by which she expressly refused to comply
with a constitutional requisition of Congress and yielded no
farther to the expostulations of their deputies, than barely to
rescind her vote of refusal without passing any positive act of
compliance. He did not wish to draw any rigid inferences from
these observations. He thought it proper however that the true
nature of the existing confederacy should be investigated, and he
was not anxious to strengthen the foundations on which it now
stands.
Proceeding to the consideration of Mr. Paterson`s plan, he
stated the object of a proper plan to be twofold,
- To preserve the Union.
- To provide a Government that will remedy the evils
felt by the States both in their united and individual capacities.
- Will it prevent those violations of the law of nations and of
Treaties which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities
of foreign wars. The tendency of the States to these violations has
been manifested in sundry instances. The files of Congress contain complaints already, from almost every nation with which
treaties have been formed. Hitherto indulgence has been shown
to us. This can not be the permanent disposition of foreign
nations. A rupture with other powers is among the greatest of
national calamities. It ought therefore to be effectually provided
that no part of a nation shall have it in its power to bring them on
the whole. The existing Confederacy does not sufficiently provide against this evil. The proposed amendment to it does not
supply the omission. It leaves the will of the States as uncontrolled
as ever.
- Will it prevent encroachments on the federal authority. A
tendency to such encroachments has been sufficiently exemplified, among ourselves, as well in every other confederated republic ancient and Modern. By the federal articles, transactions
with the Indians appertain to Congress. Yet in several instances,
the States have entered into treaties and wars with them. In like
manner no two or more States can form among themselves any
treaties etc. without the consent of Congress. Yet Virginia and
Maryland in one instance, Pennsylvania and New Jersey in
another, have entered into compacts, without previous application or subsequent apology. No State again can of right raise
troops in time of peace without the like consent. Of all cases of
the league, this seems to require the most scrupulous observance.
Has not Massachusetts, notwithstanding, the most powerful member of the Union, already raised a body of troops. Is she not now
augmenting them, without having even deigned to apprise Congress of Her intention. In fine Have we not seen the public
land dealt out to Connecticut to bribe her acquiscence in the
decree constitutionally awarded against her claim on the territory
of Pennsylvania for no other possible motive can account for the
policy of Congress in that measure.If we recur to the examples of other confederacies, we shall find in all of them the same
tendency of the parts to encroach on the authority of the whole.
He then reviewed the Amphyctionic and Achaæan confederacies
among the ancients, and the Helvetic, Germanic and Belgic
among the moderns, tracing their analogy to the United States in
the constitution and extent of their federal authorities in the
tendency of the particular members to usurp on these authorities,
and to bring confusion and ruin on the whole.He observed
that the plan of Mr. Paterson besides omitting a control over the
States as a general defence of the federal prerogatives was
particularly defective in two of its pravisions.
- Its ratification was not to be by the people at large, but by the legislatures. It could not therefore render the Acts of Congress in pursuance of ,their powers, even legally paramount to the Acts of the States.
- It gave to the federal Tribunal an appellate jurisdiction only,
even in the criminal cases enumerated. The necessity of any such
provision supposed a danger of undue acquittals in the State
tribunals. Of what avail could an appellate tribunal be, after an
acquittal. Besides in most if not all of the States, the Executives
have by their respective Constitutions the right of pardoning.
How could this be taken from them by a legislative ratification
only.
- Will it prevent trespasses of the States on each other. Of
these enough has been already seen. He instanced Acts of Virginia and Maryland which give a preference to their own Citi.
zens in cases where the Citizens of other States are entitled to
equality of privileges by the Articles of Confederation. He considered the emissions of paper money and other kindred measures as also aggressions. The States relatively to one an other
being each of them either Debtor or Creditor The creditor States
must suffer unjustly from every emission by the debtor States.
We have seen retaliating acts on this subject which threatened
danger not to the harmony only, but the tranquility of the Union.
The plan of Mr. Paterson, not giving even a negative on the
acts of the States, left them as much at liberty as ever to execute
their unrighteous projects against each other.
- Will it secwe the internal tranquility of the States themselves. The insurrections in Massachusetts admonished all the
States of the danger to which they were exposed. Yet the plan of
Mr. Paterson contained no provisions for supplying the defect
of the Confederation on this point. According to the Republican
theory indeed. Right and power being both vested in the majority, are held to be synonimous. According to fact and experience, a minority may in an appeal to force be an overmatch for
the majority.
l. If the minority happen to include all such as possess the skill and habits of military life, with such as possess the great pecuniary resources, one third may conquer the remain, ing two thirds,
2. one third of those who participate in the choice of rulers may be rendered a majority by the accession of those whose poverty disqualifies them from a suffrage, and who for obvious reasons may be more ready to join the standard of sedition than that of the established Government.
3. where slavery exists, the Republican Theory becomes still more fallacious.
- Will it secure a good internal legislation and administration
to the particular States ? In developing the evils which vitiate the
political system of the United States it is proper to take into view
those which prevail within the States individually as well as
those which affect them collectively. Since the former indirectly
affect the whole, and there is great reason to believe that the
pressure of them had a full share in the motives which produced
the present Convention. Under this head he enumerated and
animadverted on
l. the multiplicity of the laws passed by the several States.
2. the mutability of their laws.
3. the injusdce of them.
4. the impotence of them: observing that Mr. Paterson`s plan contained no remedy for this dreadful class of evils, and could not therefore be received as an adequate provision for the exigencies of the Community.
- Will it secure the Union against the influence of foreign
powers over its members. He pretended not to say that any such
influence had yet been tried, but it was naturally to be expected
that occasions would produce it. As lessons which claimed particular attention, he cited the intrigues practised among the
Amphyctionic Confederates first by the Kings of Persia, and
afterwards fatally by Philip of Macedon, among the Achaeans,
first by Macedon and afterwards no less fatally by Rome, among
the Swiss by Austria, France and the lesser neighbouring powers,
among the members of the Germanic Body by France, England,
Spain and Russia-: and in the Belgic Republic, by all the great
neighbouring powers. The plan of Mr. Paterson, not giving to
the general Councils any negative on the will of the particular
States, left the door open for the like pernicious machinations
among ourselves.
- He begged the smaller States which were most attached to
Mr. Paterson`s plan to consider the situation in which it would
leave them. In the first place they would continue to bear the
whole expence of maintaining their Delegates in Congress. It
ought not to be said that if they were willing to bear this burden
no others had a right to complain. As far as it led the smali
States to forbear keeping up a representation, by which the
public business was delayed, it was evidently a matter of common concern. An examination of the minutes of Congress would
satisfy every one that the public business had been frequently
delayed by this cause, and that the States most frequently unrepresented in Congress were not the larger States. He reminded the
convention of another consequence of leaving on a small State
the burden of maintaining a Representation in Congress. During
a considerable period of the War, one of the Representatives of
Delaware, in whom alone before the signing of the Confederation the entire vote of that State and after that event one half of
its vote, frequently resided, was a Citizen and Resident of Pennsylvania and held an office in his own State incompatible with
an appointment from it to Congress. During another period, the
same State was represented by three delegates two of whom were
citizens of Pennsylvania and the third a Citizen of New Jersey.
These expedients must have been intended to avoid the burden of
supporting delegates from their own State. But whatever might
have been the cause, was not in effect the vote of one State
doubled, and the influence of another increased by it. In the
second place the coercion, on which the efficacy of the plan
depends, can never be exerted but on themselves. The larger
States will be impregnable, the smaller only can feel the vengeance
of it. He illustrated the position by the history of the Amphyctionic
Confederates: and the ban of the German Empire. It was the
cobweb which could entangle the weak, but would be the sport
of the strong.
- He begged them to consider the situation in which they
would remain in case their pertinacious adherence to an inadmissible plan, should prevent the adoption of any plan. The contemplation of such an event was painful, but it would be prudent to
submit to the task of examining it at a distance, that the means of
escaping it might be the more readily embraced. Let the Union
of the States be dissolved, and one of two consequences must
happen. Either the States must remain individually independent
and sovereign, or two or more Confederacies must be formed
among them. In the first event would the small States be more
secure against the ambition and power of their larger neighbours,
than they would be under a general Government pervading with
equal energy every part of the Empire, and having an equal
interest in protecting every part against every other part. In the
second, can the smaller expect that their larger neighbours would
confederate with them on the principle of the present confederacy, which gives to each member, an equal suffrage, or that they
would exact less severe concessions from the smaller States, than
are proposed in the scheme of Mr. Randolph?
The great difficulty lies in the affair of Representation: and if this could be adjusted, all others would be surrnountable. It was admitted by both the gentlemen from New Jersey. (Mr. Brearly and Mr. Paterson) that it would not be just to allow Virginia which was l. times as large as Delaware an equal vote only. Their language was that it would not be safe for Delaware to allow Virginia l. times as many votes. The expedient proposed by them was that all the States should be thrown into one mass and a new partition be made into l. equal parts. Would such a scheme be practicable. The dissimilarities existing in the rules of property, as well as in the manners, habits and prejudices of the different States, amounted to a prohibition of the attempt. It had been found impossible for the power of one of the most absolute princes in Europe (King of France) directed by the wisdom of one of the most enlightened and patriotic Ministers (Mr. Neckar) that any age has produced to equalize in some points only the different usages and regulations of the different provinces. But admitting a general amalgamation and repartition of the States to be practicable, and the danger apprehended by the smaller States from a proportional representation to be real, would not a particular and voluntary coalition of these with their neighbours, be less inconvenient to the whole community, and equally effectual for their own safety. If New Jersey or Delaware conceived that an advantage would accrue to them from an equalization of the States, in which case they would necessarily form a junction with their neighbours, why might not this end be attained by leaving them at liberty by the Constitution to form such a junction whenever they pleased. And why should they wish to obtrude a like arrangement on all the States, when it was, to say the least, extremely difficult, would be obnoxious to many of the States, and when neither the inconveniency, nor the benefit of the expedient to themselves, would be lessened, by confining it to themselves. -The prospect of many new States to the Westward was another consideration of importance. If they should come into the Union at all, they would come when they contained but few inhabitants. If they should be entitled to vote according to their proportions of inhabitants, all would be right and safe. Let them have an equal vote, and a more objectionable minority than ever might give law to the whole.
