Plan for National Government (June 18)
MR. HAMILTON had been hitherto silent on the business
before the Convention, partly from respect to others whose
superior abilities age and experience rendered him unwilling to
bring forward ideas dissimilar to theirs, and partly from his
delicate situation with respect to his own State, to whose
sentiments as expressed by his Colleagues, he could by no means
accede. The crisis however which now marked our affairs, was
too serious to permit any scruples whatever to prevail over the
duty imposed on every man to contribute his efforts for the
public safety and happiness. He was obliged therefore to declare
himself unfriendly to both plans. He was particularly opposed to
that from New Jersey, being fully convinced that no amendment
of the Confederation leaving the States in possession of their
Sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose. On the other
hand he confessed he was much discouraged by the amazing
extent of the Country in expecting the desired blessings from any
general sovereignty that could be substituted. As to the powers
of the Convention he thought the doubts started on that subject
had arisen from distinctions and reasonings too subtle. Afederal
Government he conceived to mean an association of independent
Communities into one. Different Confederacies have different
powers, and exercise them in different ways. In some instances
the powers are exercised over collective bodies, in others over
individuals, as in the German Diet, and among ourselves in
cases of piracy. Great latitude therefore must be given to the
signification of the term. The plan last proposed departs itself
from the federal idea, as understood by some, since it is to
operate eventually on individuals. He agreed moreover with the
Honorable gentleman from Virginia, Mr.Randolph, that we
owed it to our Country, to do on this emergency whatever we
should deem essential to its happiness. The States sent us here to
provide for the exigences of the Union. To rely on and propose
any plan not adequate to these exigences, merely because it was
not clearly within our powers, would be to sacrifice the means to
the end. It may be said that the States can not ratify a plan not
within the purview of the article of Confederation providing for
alterations and amendments. But may not the States themselves
in which no constitutional authority equal to this purpose exists
in the Legislatures, have had in view a reference to the people at
large. In the Senate of New York, a proviso was moved, that no
act of the Convention should be binding untill it should be
referred to the people and ratified, and the motion was lost by a
single voice only, the reason assigned against it being, that it
might possibly be found an inconvenient shackle.
The great question is what provision shall we make for the
happiness of our Country. He would first make a comparative
examination of the two plans-prove that there were essential
defects in both-and point out such changes as might render a
national one, efficacious.The great and essential principles
necessary for the support of Government are:
- An active and
constant interest in supporting it. This principle does not exist in
the States in favor of the federal Government. They have evidently
in a high degree, the esprit de corps. They constantly pursue
internal interests adverse to those of the whole. They have their
particular debts their particular plans of finance etc. All these
when opposed to, invariably prevail over the requisitions and
plans of Congress.
- The love of power. Men love power. The
same remarks are applicable to this principle. The States have
constantly shown a disposition rather to regain the powers
delegated by them than to part with more, or to give effect to what
they had parted with. The ambition of their demagogues is
known to hate the control of the General Government. It may
be remarked too that the Citizens have not that anxiety to prevent
a dissolution of the General Government as of the particular
Governments. A dissolution of the latter would be fatal; of the
former would still leave the purposes of Government attainable
to a considerable degree. Consider what such a State as Virginia
will be in a few years, a few compared with the life of nations.
How strongly will it feel its importance and self-sufficiency?
- An habitual attachment of the people. The whole force of this tie
is on the side of the State Government. Its sovereignty is immediately before the eyes of the people: its protection is immediately enjoyed by them. From its hand distributive justice, and all
those acts which familiarize and endear Government to a people,
are dispensed to them.
- Force by which may be understood a
coertion of laws or coertion of arms. Congress have not the
former except in few cases. In particular States, this coercion is
nearly sufficient, though he held it in most cases, not entirely so.
A certain portion of military force is absolutely necessary in
large communities. Massachusetts is now feeling this necessity
and making provision for it. But how can this force be exerted
on the States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a war
between the parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle
spectators. They will interpose, the confusion will increase, and a
dissolution of the Union ensue.
- Influence. He did not mean
corruption, but a dispensation of those regular honors and
emoluments, which produce an attachment to the Government. Almost
all the weight of these is on the side of the States; and must
continue so as long as the States continue to exist. All the
passions then we see, of avarice, ambition, interest, which
govern most individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the current
of the States, and do not flow in the stream of the General
Government. The former therefore will generally be an
overmatch for the General Government and render any confederacy,
in its very nature precarious.
Theory is in this case fully confirmed by experience. The Amphyctionic Council had it would
seem ample powers for general purposes. It had in particular the
power of fining and using force against delinquent members.
What was the consequence? Their decrees were mere signals of
war. The Phocian war is a striking example of it. Philip at length
taking advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself into
their Councils, made himself master of their fortunes. The
German Confederacy affords another lesson. The authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as great as could be necessary. The great
feudal chiefs however, exercising their local sovereignties, soon
felt the spirit and found the means of, encroachments, which
reduced the imperial authority to a nominal sovereignty. The
Diet has succeeded~ which though aided by a Prince at its head,
of great authority independently of his imperial attributes, is a
striking illustration of the weakness of Confederated
Governments. Other examples instruct us in the same truth. The Swiss
cantons have scarce any Union at all, and have been more than
once at war with one another. How then are all these evils to be
avoided? Only by such a compleat sovereignty in the general
Government as will turn all the strong principles and passions
above mentioned on its side. Does the scheme of New Jersey
produce this effect. Does it afford any substantial remedy whatever. On the contrary it labors under great defects, and the
defect of some of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of
others. It gives a direct revenue to Congress but this will not be
sufficient. The balance can only be supplied by requisitions,
which experience proves can not be relied on. If States are to
deliberate on the mode, they will also deliberate on the object of
the supplies, and will grant or not grant as they approve or
disapprove of it. The delinquency of one will invite and counte-
nance it in others. Quotas too must in the nature of things be so
unequal as to produce the same evil. To what standard will you
resort. Land is a fallacious one. Compare Holland with Russia:
France or England with other countries of Europe. Pennsylvania
with North Carolina will the relative pecuniary abilities in those
instances, correspond with the relative value of land. Take
numbers of inhabitants for the rule and make like comparison of
different countries, and you will find it to be equally unjust. The
different degrees of industry and improvement in different Countries render the first object a precarious measure of wealth. Much
depends too on situation. Connecticut, New Jersey and North
Carolina not being commercial States and contributing to the
wealth of the commercial ones, can never bear quotas assessed
by the ordinary rules of proportion. They will and must fail in
their duty, their example will be followed, and the Union itself
be dissolved. Whence then is the national revenue to be drawn,
from Commerce, even from exports which notwithstanding the
common opinion are fit objects of moderate taxation, from
excise; etc. etc. These though not equal, are less unequal than
quotas. Another destructive ingredient in the plan, is that equal,
ity of suffrage which is so much desired by the small States. It is
not in human nature that Virginia and the large States should
consent to it, or if they did that they should long abide by it. It
shocks too much the ideas of Justice and every human feeling.
Bad principles in a Government though slow are sure in their
operation, and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has been raised
whether Congress at present have a right to keep Ships or troops
in time of peace. He leans to the negative. Mister Paterson`s plan
provides no remedy. If the powers proposed were adequate, the
organization of Congess is such that they could never be properly
and effectually exercised. The members of Congress being
chosen by the States and subject to recall, represent all the local
prejudices. Should the powers be found effectual, they will from
time to time be heaped on them, till a tyrannic sway shall be
established. The general power whatever be its form if it
preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers. Otherwise it
will be swallowed up by them. It is against all the principles of a
good Government to vest the requisite powers in such a body as
Congress. Two Sovereignties can not co-exist within the same
limits. Giving powers to Congress must eventuate in a bad
Government or in no Government. The plan of New Jersey
therefore will not do. What then is to be done. Here he was
embarrassed. The extent of the Country to be governed,
discouraged him. The expense of a general Government was also
formidable, unless there were a diminution of expense on the side of
the State Government as the case would admit. If they were
extinguished, he was persuaded that great economy might be
obtained by substituting a general Government. He did not mean
however to shock the public opinion by proposing such a
measure. On the other hand he saw no other necessity for declining
it. They are not necessary for any of the great purposes of
commerce, revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authorities he
was aware would be necessary. There must be district tribunals,
corporations for local purposes. But cui bono, the vast and
expensive apparatus now appertaining to the States. The only
difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to him, was that of
drawing representatives from the extremes to the center of the
Community. What inducements can be offered that will suffice.
The moderate wages for the first branch would only be a bait to
little demagogues. Three dollars or thereabouts he supposed
would be the utmost. The Senate he feared from a similar cause.
would be filled by certain undertakers who wish for particular
offices under the Government. This view of the subject almost
led him to despair that a Republican Government could be
established over so great an extent. He was sensible at the same
time that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form.
In his private opinion he had no scruple in declaring, supported
as he was by the opinions of so many of the wise and good, that
the British Government was the best in the world, and that he
doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America. He hoped Gentlemen of different opinions would bear with
him in this, and begged them to recollect the change of opinion
on this subject which had taken place and was still going on. It
was once thought that the power of Congress was amply sufficient to secure the end of their institutiom The error was now
seen by every one. The members most tenacious of republicanism,
he observed, were as loud as any in declaiming against the
vices of democracy. This progress of the public mind led him to
anticipate the time, when others as well as himself would join in
the praise bestowed by Mr. Neckar on the British Constitution,
namely, that it is the only Government in the world ,which
unites public strength with individual security.In every community where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of
it into the few and the many. Hence separate interests will arise.
There will be debtors and creditors etc. Give all power to the
many, they will oppress the few. Both therefore ought to have
power, that each may defend itself against the other. To the want
of this check we owe our paper money, instalment laws etc. To
the proper adjustment of it the British owe the excellence of their
Constitutiom Their house of Lords is a most noble institution.
Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a sufficient interest
by means of their property, in being faithful to the interest, they
form a permanent barrier against every pernicious innovation,
whether attempted on the part of the Crown or of the Commons.
No temporary Senate will have firmness enough to answer the
purpose. The Senate, of Maryland, which seems to be so much
appealed to, has not yet been sufficiently tried. Had the people
been unanimous and eager, in the late appeal to them on the
subject of a paper emission they would have yielded to the
torrent. Their acquiescing in such an appeal is a proof of it.
Gentlemen differ in their opinions concerning the necessary
checks, from the different estimates they form of the human
passions. They suppose seven years a sufficient period to give
the senate an adequate firmness, from not duly considering the
amazing violence and turbulence of the democratic spirit. When
a great object of Government is pursued, which seizes the
popular passions, they spread like wild fire, and become irresistable.
He appealed to the gentlemen from the New England States
whether experience had not there verified the remark. As to the
Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good could be
established on Republican principles. Was not this giving up the
merits of the question: for can there be a good Government
without a good Executive. The English model was the only good
one on this subject. The Hereditary interest of the King was so
interwoven with that of the Nation, and his personal emoluments
so great, that he was placed above the danger of being corrupted
from abroad, and at the same time was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controled, to answer the purpose of the
institution at home. One of the weak sides of Republics was their
being liable to foreign influence and cormption. Men of little
character, acquiring great power become easily the tools of
intermedling Neighbors. Sweden was a striking instance. The
French and English had each their parties during the late Revolu
tion which was affected by the predominant influence of the
former-What is the inference from all these observations? That
we ought to go as far in order to attain stability and permanency,
as republican principles will admit. Let one branch of the Legis
lature hold their places for life or at least during good behaviour.
Let the Executive also be for life. He appealed to the feelings of
the members present whether a term of seven years, would
induce the sacrifices of private affairs which an acceptance of
public trust would require, so so as to ensure the services of the
best Citizens. On this plan we should have in the Senate a
permanent will, a weighty interest, which would answer essential
purposes. But is this a Republican Government, it will be asked?
Yes if all the magistrates are appointed, and vacancies are filled
by the people, or a process of election originating with the
people. He was sensible that an Executive constituted as he
proposed would have in fact but little of the power and indepen
dence that might be necessary. On the other plan of appointing
him for 7 years, he thought the Executive ought to have but little
power. He would be ambitious, with the means of making
creatures; and as the object of his ambition would be to prolong
his power, it is probable that in case of a war, he would avail
himself of the emergence, to evade or refuse a degradation from
his place. An Executive for life has not this motive for forgetting
his fidelity, and will therefore be a safer depository of power. It
will be objected probably, that such an Executive will be an
Elective Monarch, and will give birth to the tumults which
characterize that form of Govemment. He would reply that Monarch
is an indefinite term. It marks not either the degree or duration of
power. If this Executive Magistrate would be a monarch for
life-the other proposed by the Report from the Committee of
the whole, would be a monarch for seven years. The circum
stance of being elective was also applicable to both. It had been
observed by judicious writers that elective monarchies would be
the best if they could be guarded against the
tumults excited by
the ambition and intrigues of competitors. He was not sure that
tumults were an inseparable evil. He rather thought this character
of Elective Monarchies had been taken rather from particular
cases than from general principles. The election of Roman Em
perors was made by the
Army. In
Poland the election is made by great rival princes with independent power, and ample means, of
raising commotions. In the German Empire, the appointment is
made by the Electors and Princes, who have equal motives and
means, for exciting cabals and parties. Might not such a mode of
election be devised among ourselves as will defend the commu
nity against these effects in any dangerous degree. Having made
these observations he would read to the Committee a sketch of a
plan which he should prefer to either of those under consider
ation. He was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most
members. But will such a plan be adopted out of doors. In return
he would ask will the people adopt the other plan. At present
they will adopt neither. But he sees the Union dissolving or
already dissolved-he sees evils operating in the States which
must soon cure the people of their fondness for democracies-he
sees that a great progress has been already made and is still
going on in the public mind. He thinks therefore that the people
will in time be unshackled from their prejudices, and whenever
that happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at stopping
where the plan of Mr. Randolph would place them, but be ready
to go as far at least as he proposes. He did not mean to offer the
paper he had sketched as a proposition to the Committee. It was
meant only to give a more correct view of his ideas, and to
suggest the amendments which he should probably propose to
the plan of Mr. Randolph in the proper stages of its future
discussion. He read his sketch in the words following, to wit:
- "The Supreme Legislative power of the United States of
America to be vested in two different bodies of men; the one to
be called the Assembly, the other the Senate who together shall
form the Legislature of the United States with power to pass all
laws whatsoever subject to the Negative hereafter mentioned.
- The Assembly to consist of persons elected by the people
to serve for three years.
- The Senate to consist of persons elected to serve during
good behaviour- their election to be made by electors chosen for
that purpose by the people: in order to do this the States to be
divided into election districts. On the death, removal or
resignation of any Senator his place to be filled out of the district from
which he came.
- The supreme Executive authority of the United States to
be vested in a Governor to be elected to serve during good
behaviour~the election to be made by Electors chosen by the
people in the Election Districts aforesaid. The authorities and
functions of the Executive to be as follows: to have a negative on
all laws about to be passed, and the execution of all laws passed;
to have the direction of war when authorized or begun; to have
with the advice and approbation of the Senate the power of
making all treaties; to have the sole appointment of the heads or
chief officers of the departments of Finance, War and Foreign
Affairs; to have the nomination of all other officers
(Ambassadors to foreign Nations included) subject to the approbation or
rejection of the Senate; to have the power of pardoning all
offences except Treason; which he shall not pardon without the
approbation of the Senate.
- On the death resignation or removal of the Governor his
authorities to be exercised by the President of the Senate till a
Successor be appointed.
- The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war, the
power of advising and approving all Treaties, the power of
approving or rejecting all appointments of offlcers except the
heads or chiefs of the departments of Finance War and Foreign
Affairs.
- The supreme Judicial authority to be vested in Judges
to hold their offices during good behaviour with adequate and
permanent salaries. This Court to have original jurisdiction in all
causes of capture, and an appelative jurisdiction in all causes in
which the revenues of the general Government or the Citizens of
foreign Nations are concerned.
- The Legislature of the United States to have power to
institute Courts in each State for the determination of all matters
of general concern.
- The Governor Senators and all officers of the United
States to be liable to impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct;
and upon conviction to be removed from office, and disqualified
for holding any place of trust or profit-All impeachments to be
tried by a Court to consist of the Chief (Justice) or Judge of the
superior Court of Law of each State, provided such Judge shall
hold his place during good behavior, and have a permanent salary.
- All laws of the particular States contrary to the Constitution
or laws of the United States to be utterly void; and the better to
prevent such laws being passed, the Governor or president of
each State shall be appointed by the General Government and
shall have a negative upon the laws about to be passed in the
State of which he is Governor or President.
- No State to have any forces land or Naval; and the Militia
of all the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction of
the United States, the officers of which to be appointed and
cornmissioned by them"
