Development of the War

Magnitude of this war was on a scale as such that no man had ever seen before. The numbers of troops assembled were in numbers larger than ever seen. The territory that was fought over was more than the Rhineland it was a broad expanse of territory that not only engulfed North America but also the world. Quarrels over the Ohio River Valley were the forerunning and immediate cause of the French and Indian war. The underlying cause of the war was a period of more than 100 years of rivalry. The rivalry in which a scratch or poke can easily turn in to an all out brawl eventually leading to a severe break in relations between French and Britain. The strengths of Britain over France might have been thought to be overwhelming but they actually are not. Although the British resources of money and men (militarily speaking) was seemingly endless the British did not have an impeccable image. The French were outnumbered severely in population size, but the networks of forts that they had built up, as well as the small army that was already in place, did move the French to earlier easy victories.
French troops received orders easily from a central government and little confusion provided for great efficiency. Many times British orders were delayed or out dated by the long travel across the Atlantic from Britain. The lack of a government contributed to some of the anarchy during the French and Indian War (Notes 86).
While the Albany Plan of Union was a promising plan, its disapproval by the colonies for being too strong quickly made an easy solution of some governmental problems virtually impossible. The success of both Britain and the colonies was depending on a very shoddy plan of war. The assumption on anyone’s part that this victory would be one sided was simply refuted in the first months of the war. The defeat of Washington at Fort Necessity show the hubris that the British may be starting to develop. The beliefs of the colonials that as long as the Redcoats were here that they were safe may be viewed as anything but true. Colonials welcomed the Redcoats with open arms but soon realized that they weren’t as magnificent and noteworthy as they were played up to be. The disappointment of the colonials was due to the simple fact that the Redcoats fought a European war not a new style war that limited success and sometimes determined failure.

The cost of the war in both men and dollars was great to England. About 10,000 British troops were needed for the defense of North America after the war, costing approximately thirty-five hundred thousand pounds a year (Hafstadter 76). Many colonials were not welcoming the change, and voiced their opinions as such. Officials in New Jersey stated that America could fend for themselves. In Massachusetts one man declared “sending troops to defend America . . . has great appearance of care over but really is as absurd as it is needless (Jennings 463).” Multitudes of people became unhappy and were subordinated by soldiers scourging their tongues at the colonials (Jennings 464). There was also the exorbitant cost of the war that was estimated at about two and a half million pounds (Hafstadter 76). Although the war was fought on many fronts a large portion of it was fought in the Americas, and therefore the British government thought that the colonials should pay their fair share of the cost. The severe debt though was of little concern compared to the thirty-five hundred thousand pounds it would cost to supply and train 10,000 troops for the protection of the colonies. “Facing heavy costs of supporting a standing army in the North American colonies, Britain hoped to shift some of the fiscal burden onto the colonists by imposing a series of taxes without consulting colonial governments (Eliot).” The debt of war was mostly paid for by taxes from in England itself.