Debate on State Equality in the Senate (June 28-July 2)

Why are counties of the same states represented in proportion to their numbers? Is it because the representatives are chosen by the people themselves? So will be the representatives in the National Legislature. Is it because, the larger have more at stake tnan the smaller. The case will be the same with the larger and smaller States. Is it because the laws are to operate immediately on their persons and properties? The same is the case in some degree as the articles of confederation stand, the same will be the case in a far greater degree under the plan proposed to be substituted. In the cases of captures, of piracies, and of offences in a federal army, the property and persons of individuals depend on the laws of Congress. By the plan proposed a compleat power of taxation, the highest prerogative of supremacy is proposed to be vested in the National Government. Many other powers are added which assimilate it to the Government of individual States. The negative proposed on the State laws, will make it an essential branch of the State Legislatures and of course will require that it should be exercised by a body established on like principles with the other branches of those Legislatures. That it is not necessary to secure the small States against the large ones he conceived to be equally obvious -Was a combination of the large ones dreaded? This must arise either from some interest common to Virginia, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania and distinguishing them from the other States or from the mere circumstance of similarity of size. Did any such common interest exist? In point of situation they could not have beep more effectually separated from each other by the most jealous citizen of the most jealous State. In point of manners, Religion, and the other circumstances which sometimes beget affection between different communities, they were not more assimilated than the other States.-In point of the staple productions they were as dissimilar as any three other States in the Union. The Staple of Massachusetts was fish, of Pennsylva nia flour of Virginia Tobacco. Was a combination to be apprehended from the mere circumstance of equality of size. Experience suggested no such danger. The journals of Congress did not present any peculiar association of these States in the votes recorded. It had never been seen that different Counties in the same State, conformable in extent, but disagreeing in other circumstances, betrayed a propensity to such combinations. Experience rather taught a contrary lesson. Among individuals of superior eminence and weight in Society, rivalships were much more frequent than coalitions. Among independent nations, preeminent over their neighbours, the same remark was verified. Carthage and Rome tore one another to pieces instead of uniting their forces to devour the weaker nations of the Earth. The Houses of Austria and Prance were hostile as long as they remained the greatest powers of Europe: England and France have succeeded to the preeminence and to the enmity. To this principle we owe perhaps our liberty. A coalition between those powers would have been fatal to us. Among the principal members of ancient and Modern confederacies, we find the same effect from the same cause, The contentions, not the Coalitions of Sparta, Athens and Thebes, proved fatal to the smaller members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy. The contentions, not the combinations of Prussia and Austria, have distracted and oppressed the Germanic empire. Were the large States formidable singly to their smaller neighbours? On this supposition the latter ought to wish for such a general Government as will operate with equal energy on the former as on themselves. The more lax the band the more liberty the larger will have to avail themselves of their superior force. Here again Experience was an instructive monitor. What is the situation of the weak compared with the strong in those stages of civilization in which the violence of individuals is least controled by an efficient Government. The Heroic period of Ancient Greece, the feudal licentiousness of the middle ages of Europe, the existing condition of the American Savages answer this question. What is the situation of the minor sovereigns in the great society of independent nations, in which the more powerful are under no control but the nominal authority of the law of Nations? Is not the danger to the former exactly in proportion to their weakness. But there are cases still more in point. What was the condition of the weaker members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy Plutarch -life of Themistocles- will inform us that it happened but too often that the strongest cities corrupted and awed the weaker, and that Judgment went in favor of the more powerful party. What is the condition of the lesser states in the German Confederacy? We all know that they are exceedingly trampled upon, and that they owe their safety as far as they enjoy it, partly to their enlisting themselves, under the rival banners of the preeminent members, partly to alliances with neighbouring Princes which the Consitution of the Empire does not prohibit. What is the state of things in the lax system of the Dutch Confederacy? Holland contains about one half the people, supplies about one half of the money, and by her influence, silently and indirectly governs the whole republic. In a word, the two extremes before us are a perfect separation and a perfect incorporation, of the l3 States. In the first case they would be independent nations subject to no law, but the law of nations. In the last, they would be mere counties of one entire republic, subject to one common law. In the fist case the smaller States would have every thing to fear from the larger. In the last they would have nothing to fear. The true policy of the small States therefore lies in promoting those principles and that form of Government which will most approximate the States to the condition of counties. Another consideration may be added. If the General Government be feeble, the large States distrusting its continuance, and foreseeing that their importance and security may depend on their own size and strength, will never submit to a partition. Give to the General Government sufficient energy and permanency, and you remove the objectiom Gradual partitions of the large, and junctions of the small States will be facilitated, and time may effect that equalization, which is wished for by the small States now, but can never be accomplished at once.

The controversy must be endless whilst Gentlemen differ in the grounds of their arguments. Those on one side considering the States as districts of people composing one political Society, those on the other considering them as so many political societies. The fact is that the States do exist as political Societies, and a Government is to be formed for them in their political capacity, as well as for the individuals composing them, Does it not seem to follow, that if the States as such are to exist they must be armed with some power of self-defence. This is the idea of Colonel Mason who appears to have looked to the bottom of this matter. Besides the Aristocratic and other interests, which ought to have the means of defending themselves the States have their interests as such, and are equally entitled to like means. On the whole he thought that as in some respects the States are to be considered in their political capacity, and in others as districts of individual citizens, the two ideas embraced on different sides, instead of being opposed to each other, ought to be combined; that in one branch the people, ought to be represented, in the other the States...

agreed with Dr. Johnson, that the mixed nature of the Government ought to be kept in view, but thought too much stress was laid on the rank of the States as political societies. There was a gradation, he observed, from the smallest corporation, with the most limited powers, to the largest empire with the most perfect sovereignty. He pointed out the limitations on the sovereignty of the States, as now confederated their laws in relation to the paramount law of the Confederacy were analogous to that of bye laws to the supreme law within a State. Under the proposed Government the powers of the States will be much farther reduced. According to the views of every member, the General Government will have powers far beyond those exercised by the British Parliament, when the States were part of the British Empire. It will in particular have the power, without the consent of the State Legislatures, to levy money directly on the people themselves, and therefore not to divest such unequal portions of the people as composed the several States, of an equal voice, would subject the system to the reproaches and evils which have resulted from the vicious representation in Great Britain. He entreated the gentlemen representing the small States to renounce a principle which was confessedly unjust, which could never be admitted, and if admitted must infuse mortality into a Constitution which we wished to last forever. He prayed them to ponder well the consequences of suffering the Confederacy to go to pieces. It had been said that the want of energy in the large states would be a security to the small. It was forgotten that this want of energy proceeded from the supposed security of the States against all external danger. Let each state depend on itself for its security, and let apprehensions arise of danger from distant powers or from neighbouring States, and the languishing condition of all the States large as well as small, would soon be transformed into vigorous and high toned Government. His great fear was that their Governments would then have too much energy, that these might not only be formidable in the large to the small States, but fatal to the internal liberty of alh The same causes which have rendered the old world the Theatre of incessant wars, and have banished liberty from the face of it, would soon produce the same effects here. The weakness and jealousy of the small States would quickly introduce some regular military force against sudden danger from their powerful neighbours. The example would be followed by others, and would soon become universal. In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension of war, has the same tendency to render the head too large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defence against foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people. It is perhaps questionable, whether the best concerted system of absolute power in Europe could maintain itself, in a situation, where no alarms of external danger could tame the people to the domestic yoke. The insular situation of Great Britain was the principal cause of her being an exception to the general fate of Europe. It has rendered less defence necessary, and admitted a kind of defence which could not be used for the purpose of oppression. These consequences he conceived ought to be apprehended whether the States should run into a total separation from each other, or should enter into partial confederacies. Either event would be truly deplorable, and those who might be accessary to either, could never be forgiven by their Country, nor by themselves.

observed that individuals forming political Societies modify their rights differently, with regard to suffrage. Examples of it are found in all the States. In all of them some individuals are deprived of the right altogether, not having the requisite qualification of property. In some of the States the right of suffrage is allowed in some cases and refused in others. To vote for a member in one branch, a certain quantum of property, to vote for a member in another branch of the Legislature, a higher quantum af property is required. In like manner States may modify their right of suffrage differently, the larger appreing a larger, the smaller a smaller share of it. But as States are a collection of individual men which ought we to respect most, the rights of the people composing them, or of the artificial beings resulting from the composition. Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been said that if the smaller States renounce their equality, they renounce at the same time their liberty. The truth is it is a contest for power, not for liberty, Will the men composing the small States be less free than those composing the larger. The State of Delaware having 4O,OOO souls will lose power, if she has one tenth only of the votes allowed to Pennsylvania having ~OO~ but will the people of Delaware be less free, if each citizen has an equal vote with each citizen of Pennsylvania. He admitted that common residence within the same State would produce a certain degree of attachment, and that this principle might have a certain influence in public affairs. He thought however that this might by some precautions be in a great measure excluded, and that no material inconvenience could result from it, as there could not be any ground for combination among the States whose influence was most dreaded. The only considerable distinction of interests, lay between the carrying and non-carrying States, which divide instead of uniting the largest States. No considerable inconvenience had been found from the division of the State of New York into different districts of different sizes. Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of partial confederacies, had been pointed out. He would add another of a most serious nature. Alliances will immediately be formed with different rival and hostile nations of Europe, who will foment disturbances among ourselves, and make us parties to all their own quarrels. Foreign Nations having American dominions are and must be jealous of us. Their representatives betray the utmost anxiety for our fate, and for the result of this meeting, which must have an essential influence on it. It had been said that respectability in the eyes of foreign Nations was not the object at which we aimed, that the proper object of republican Government was domestic tranquility and happiness. This was an ideal distinctiom No Government could give us tranquility and happiness at home, which did not possess sufficient stability and strength to make us respectable abroad. This was the critical moment for forming such a Government. We should run every risk in trusting to future amendments. As yet we retain the habits of uniom We are weak and sensible of our weakness. Henceforward the motives will become feebler, and the difficulties greater. It is a miracle that we were now here exercising our tranquil and free deliberations on the subject. It would be madness to trust to future miracles. A thousand causes must obstluct a reproduction of them.

moved that the rule of suffrage in the second branch be the same with that established by the articles of confederatiom He was nat sorry on the whole he said that the vote just passed, had determined against this rule in the first branch. He hoped it would become a ground of compromise with regard to the second branch. We were partly national, partly federal. The proportional representation in the first branch was conformable to the national principle and would secure the largt States against the small. An equality of voices was conformable to the federal principle and was necessary t0 secure the Small States against the large. He trusted that on this middle ground a compromise would take place. He did not see that it could or any other. And if no compromise should take place, our meeting would not only be in vain but worse than in vain. To the Eastward he was sure Massachusetts was the only State tha would listen to a proposition for excluding the States as equal political Societies, from an equal voice in both branches. The others would risk every consequence rather than part with sa dear a right. An attempt to deprive them of it, was at once cutting the body of America in two, and as he supposed would be the case, somewhere about this part of it. The large States he conceived would notwithstanding the equality of votes, have an i nfluence that would maintain their superiority. Holland, as had been admitted by Mr. Madison, had, notwithstanding a like equality in the Dutch Confederacy, a prevailing influence in the public measures. The power of self-defence was essential to the small States. Nature had given it to the smallest insect of the creatiom He could never admit that there was no danger of combinations among the large States. They will like individuals find out and avail themselves of the advantage to be gained by it It was true the danger would be greater, if they were contiguous and had a more immediate common interest. A defensive combination of the small States was rendered more difficult by their greater number. He would mention another consideration of great weight. The existing confederation was founded on the equality of the States in the article of suffrage, was it meant to pay no regard to this antecedent plighted faith. Let a strong Executive, a Judiciary and Legislative power be created, but Let not too much be attempted, by which all may be lost. He was not in general a half-way man, yet he preferred doing half the good we could, rather than do nothing at all. The other half may be added, when the necessity shall be more fully experienced.

did not expect such a motion after the establishment of the contrary principle in the first branch, and considering the reasons which would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed in the first branch. The Gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Ellsworth) had pronounced that if the motion should not be acceded to, of all the States North of Pennsylvania one only would agree to any General Government. He entertained more favorable hopes of Connecticut and of the other Northern States. He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause, and that they would not abandon a Country to which they were bound by so many strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored event happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments nor his duty. If the minority of the people of America refuse to coalesce with the majority on just the proper principles, if a separation must take place, it could never happen on better grounds. The votes of yesterday against the just principle of representation, were as 22 to 9O of the people of America. Taking the opinions to be the same on this point, and he was sure if there was any room for change, it could not be on the side of the majority, the question will be shall less than one quarter of the United States withdraw themselves from the Union, or shall more than tnree quarters renounce the inherent, indisputable, and unalienable rights of men, in favor of the artificial systems of States. If issue must be joined, it was on this point he would choose to join it. The gentleman from Connecticut in supposing that the prepondenancy secured to the majority in tne first branch had removed the objections to an equality of votes in tne second branch for the security of the minority, narrowed the case extremely. Such an equality will enable the minority to control on all cases whatsoever, the sentiments and interests of the majority. Seven States will control six. Seven States, according to the estimates that had been used, composed twenty-four ninetieths of the whole people. It would be in the power then of less than one third to overrule two thirds whenever a question should happen to divide the States in that manner. Can we forget for whom we are forming a Government? Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called States? Will our honest Constituents be satisfied with metaphysical distinctions. Will they ought they to be satisfieded with being told that the one third compose the greater number of States? The rule of suffrage ought on every principle to be the same in the second as in the first branch. If the Government be not laid on this foundation, it can be neither solid nor lasting. Any other principle will be local, confined and temporary. This will expand with the expansion, and grow with the growth of the United States. Much has been said of an imaginary combination of three States. Sometimes a danger of monarchy, sometimes of aristocracy, has been charged on it. No explanation however of the danger has been vouchsafed. It would be easy to prove both from reason and history that rivalships would be more probable than coalitions, and that there are no coinciding interests that could produce the latter. No answer has yet been given to the observations of Mr. Madison, on this subject. Should the Executive Magistrate be taken from one of the large States would not the other two be thereby thrown into the scale with the other States, Whence then the danger of monarchy? Are the people of the three large States more aristocratic than those of the small ones. Whence then the danger of aristocracy from their influence. It is all a mere illusion of names? We talk of States, till we forget what they are composed of. Is a real and fair majority, the natural hot-bed of aristocracy? It is a part of the definition of this species of Government or rather of tyranny, that the smaller number governs the greater? It is true that a majority of States in the second branch can not carry a law against a majority of the people in the first. But this removes half only of the objection. Bad Governments are of two sorts
  1. that which does too little
  2. that which does too much: that which fails through weakness; and that which destroys through oppression?

Under which of these evils do the United States at present groan? Under the weakness and inefficiency of its Government. To remedy this weakness we have been sent to this Convention. If the motion should be agreed to, we shall leave the United States fettered precisely as heretofore, with the additional mortification of seeing the good purposes of the fair representation of the people in the first branch, defeated in second. Twenty four will still control sixty six. He lamented that such a disagreement should prevail on the point of representation, as he did not foresee that it would happen on the other point most contested, the boundary between the General and the local authorities. He thought the States necessary and valuable parts of a good system.

The capital objection of Mr. Wilson, that the minority will rule the majority, is not true. The power is given to the few to save them from being destroyed by the many. If an equality of votes had been given to them in both branches, the objection might have had weight. Is it a novel thing that the few should have a check on the many. Is it not the case in the British Constitution the wisdom of which so many gentlemen have united in applauding. Have not the House of Lords, who form so small a proportion of the nation a negative on the laws, as a necessary defence of their peculiar rights against the encroachment of the Commons. No instance of a Confederacy has existed in which an equality of voices has not been exercised by the members of it. We are running from one extreme to another, We are razing the foundations of the building, when we need only repair the roof. No salutary measure has been lost for want of a majority of the States, to favor it, If security be all that the great States wish for the first branch secures them. The danger of combinations among them is not imaginary. Although no particular abuses could be foreseen by him, the possibility of them would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could easily conceive cases in which they might result from such combinations. Suppose that in pursuance of some commercial treaty or arrangement, three or four free ports and no more were to be established would not combinations be formed in favor of Boston, Philadelphia, and some port in Chesapeak. A like concert might be formed in the appointment of the great officers. He appealed again to the obligations of the federal pact which was still in force, and which had been entered into with so much solemnity. persuading himself that some regard would still be paid to the plighted faith under which each State small as well as great, held an equal right of suffrage in the general Councils. His remarks were not the result of partial or local views. The State he represented, Connecticut, held a middle rank.

did justice to the able and close reasoning of Mr. Ellsworth but must observe that it did not always accord with itself. On another occasion, the large States were described by him as the Aristocratic States, ready to oppress the small Now the small are the House of Lords requiring a negative to defend them against the more numerous commons. Mr. Ellsworth had also erred in saying that no instance had existed in which confederated States had not retained to themselves a perfect equality of suffrage. Passing over the German system in which the King of Prussia has nine voices, he reminded Mr. Ellsworth of the Lycian confederacy, in which the component members had votes proportioned to their importance, and which Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for that form of Government. Had the fact been as stated by Mr. Ellsworth it would have been of little avail to him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments against him, the History and fate of the several confederacies modern as well as Ancient, demonstrating some radical vice in their structure. In reply to the appeal of Mr. Ellsworth to the faith plighted in the existing federal compact, he remarked that the party claiming from others an adherence to a common engagement ought at least to be guiltless itself of a violatiom Of all the States however Connecticut was perhaps least able to urge this plea. Besides the various omissions to perform the stipulated acts from which no State was free, the Legislature of that State had by a pretty recent vote, positively, refused to pass a law for complying with the Requisitions of Congress and had transmitted a copy of the vote to Congress. It was urged, he said, continually that an equality of votes in the second branch was not only necessary to secure the small, but would be perfectly safe to the large ones whose majority in the first branch was an effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding this apparent defence, the majority of States might sdll injure the majority of people,

  1. They could obstruct the wishes and interests of the majority.
  2. They could extort measures repugnant to the wishes and interest of the Majority.
  3. They could impose measures adverse thereto; as the second branch will probly exercise some great powers, in which the first will not participate.

He admitted that every peculiar interest whether in any class of citizens, or any descripdon of States, ought to be secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack there ought to be given a constitutional power of defence. But he contended that the States were divided into different interests not by their difference of size, but by other circumstances, the most material of which resulted partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great division of interests in the United States. It did not lie between the large and small States. It lay between the Northern and Southern, and if any defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to these two interests. He was so strongly impressed with this important truth that he had been casting about in his mind for some expedient that would answer the purpose. The one which had occurred was that instead of proportioning the votes of the States in both branches, to their respective numbers of inhabitants computing the slaves in the ratio of 5 to 3 they should be represented in one branch according to the number of free inhabitants only, and in the other according to the whole number counting the slaves as if free. By this arrangement the Southern Scale would have the advantage in one House, and the Northern in the other. He had been restrained from proposing this expedient by two considerations: one was his unwillingness to urge any diversity of interests on an occasion where it is but too apt to arise of itself, the other was, the inequality of powers that must be vested in the two branches, and which would destroy the equilibrium of interests...

observed that the simple question was whether each State should have an equal vote in the second branch; that it must be apparent to those gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this equality, nor the report as it stood; that the report was as susceptible of melioration as the motion; that a reform would be nugatory and nominal only if we should make another Congress of the proposed Senate; that if the adherence to an equality of votes was fixed and unalterable, there could not be less obstinacy on the other side, and that we were in fact cut asunder already, and it was in vain to shut our eyes against it, that he was however filled with astonishrnent that if we were convinced that every man in America was secured in all his rights, we should be ready to sacrifice this substantial good to the phantom of State sovereignty, that his feelings were more harrowed and his fears more agitated for his Country than he could express, that he conceived this to be the last opportunity of providing for its liberty and happiness, that he could not therefore but repeat his amazement that when a just Government founded on a fair representation of the people of America was within our reach, we should renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the ideal freedom and importance of States, that should this wonderful illusion continue to prevail, his mind was prepared for every event, rather than to sit down under a Government founded in a vicious principle of representation, and which must be as short lived as it would be unjust.
That all the states at present are equally sovereign and independent, has been asserted from every quarter of this house. Our deliberations here are a confirmation of the position, and I may add to it, that each of them act from interested, and many from ambitious motives. Look at the votes which have been given on the floor of this house, and it will be found that their numbers, wealth and local views, have actuated their determinations, and that the larger states proceed as if our eyes were already perfectly blinded. Impartiality, with them, is already out of the question,the reported plan is their political creed, and they support it, right or wrong. Even the diminutive state of Georgia has an eye to her future wealth and greatness. South Carolina, puffed up with the possession of her wealth and negroes, and North Carolina, are all, from different views, united with the great states. And these latter, although it is said they can never, from interested views, form a coalition, we find closely united in one scheme of interest and ambition, notwithstanding they endeavor to amuse us with the purity of their principles and the rectitude of their intentions, in asserting that the general government must be drawn from an equal representation of the people. Pretences to support ambition are never wanting. Their cry is, where is the danger, and they insist that although the powers of the general government will be increased, yet it will be for the good of the whole, and although the three great states form nearly a majority of the people of America, they never will hurt or injure the lesser states. I do not, gentlemen, trust you. If you possess the power, the abuse of it could not be checked, and what then would prevent you from exercising it to our destruction. You gravely alledge that there is no danger of combination, and triumphantly ask, how could combinations be affected? "The larger states," you say, "all differ in productions and commerce, and experience shows that instead of combinations, they would be rivals, and counteract the views of one another." This, I repeat, is language calculated only to amuse us. Yes, sir, the larger states will be rivals, but not against each other: they will be rivals against the rest of the states. But it is urged that such a government would suit the people, and that its principles are equitable and just. How often has this argument been refuted, when applied to a federal government? The small states never can agree to the Virginia plan, and why then is it still urged. But it is said that it is not expected that the state governments will approve the proposed system, and that this house must directly carry it to THE PEOPLE for their approbation. Is it come to this, then, that the sword must decide this controversy, and that the horrors of war must be added to the rest of our misfortunes. But what have the people already said? We find the confederation defective,go, and give additional powers to the confederation, give to it the imposts, regulation of trade, power to collect the taxes, and the means to discharge our foreign and domestic debts. Can we not then, as their delegates, agree upon these points? As their ambassadors, can we not clearly grant those powers? Why then, when we are met, must entire, distinct, and new grounds be taken, and a government, of which the people had no idea, be instituted? And are we to be told, if we won't agree to it, it is the last moment of our deliberations? I say, it is indeed the last moment, if we do agree to this assumption of power. The states will never again be entrapped into a measure like this. The people will say the small states would confederate, and grant further powers to congress, but you, the large states, would not. Then the fault will be yours, and all the nations of the earth will justify us. But what is to become of our public debts if we dissolve the union? Where is your plighted faith? Will you crush the smaller states, or must they be left unmolested? Sooner than be ruined, there are foreign powers who will take us by the hand. I say not this to threaten or intimidate, but that we should reflect seriously before we act. If we once leave this floor, and solemnly renounce your new project, what will be the consequence? You will annihilate your federal government, and ruin must stare you in the face. Let us then do what is in our power --mend and enlarge the confederation, but not alter the federal system. The people expect this, and no more. We all agree in the necessity of a more efficient government, and cannot this be done. Although my state is small, I know and respect its rights, as much- at least- as those who have the honor to represent any of the larger states.

was for preserving the States in a subordinate degree, and as far as they could be necessary for the purposes stated by Mr. Ellsworth. He did not think a full answer had been given to those who apprehended a dangerous encroachment on their jurisdictions. Expedients might be devised as he conceived that would give them all the security the nature of things would admit of. In the establishment of Societies the Constitution was to the Legislature what the laws were to individuals. As the fundamental rights of individuals are secure by express provisions in the State Constitutions, why may not a like security be provided for the Rights of States in the National Constitution. The articles of Union between England and Scotland furnish an example of such a provision in favor of sundry rights of Scotland. When that Union was in agitation, the same language of apprehension which has been heard from the smaller States, was in the mouths of the Scotch patriots. The articles however have not been violated and the Scotch have found an increase of prosperity and happiness. He was aware that this will be called a mere paper security. He thought it a sufficient answer to say that if fundamental articles of compact, are no sufficient defence against physical power, neither will there be any safety against it if there be no compact. He could not sit down, without taking some notice of the language of the honorable gentleman from Delaware, Mr. Bedford. It was not he that had uttered a dictatorial language. This intemperance had marked the honorable gentleman himself. It was not he who with a vehemence unprecedented in that House, had declared himself ready to turn his hopes from our common Country, and court the protection of some foreign hand. This too was the language of the Honorable member himself. He was grieved that such a thought had entered into his heart. He was more grieved that such an expression had dropped from his lips. The gentleman could only excuse it to himself on the score of passion. For himself whatever might be his distress, he would never court relief from a foreign power.

thought a Committee adviseable as the Convention had been equally divided. He had a stronger reason also. The mode of appointing the second branch tended he was sure to defeat the object of it. What is this object, to check the precipitation, changeableness, and excesses of the first branch. Every man of observation had seen in the democratic branches of the State Legislatures, precipitation,in Congress changeableness, in every department excesses against personal liberty private property and personal safety. What qualities are necessary to constitute a check in this case. Abilities and virtue, are equally necessary in both branches. Something more then is now wanted.
  1. The checking branch must have a personal interest in checking the other branch: one interest must be opposed to another interest. Vices as they exist, must be turned against each other.
  2. It must have great personal property, it must have the aristocratic spirit, it must love to lord it through pride, pride is indeed the great principle that actuates both the poor and the rich. It is this principle which in the former resists, in the latter abuses authority.
  3. It should be independent. In Religion the Creature is apt to forget its Creator. That it is otherwise in political affairs, the late debates here are an unhappy proof. The aristocratic body, should be as independent and as firm as the democratic. If the members of it are to revert to a dependence on the democratic choice, the democratic scale will preponderate. All the guards contrived by America have not restrained the Senatorial branches of the Legislatures from a servile complaisance to the democratic. If the second branch is to be dependent we are better without it. To make it independent, it should be for life. It will then do wrong, it will be said. He believed so. He hoped so. The Rich will strive to establish their dominion and enslave the rest. They always did. They always will. The proper security against them is to form them into a separate interest. The two forces will then control each other. Let the rich mix with the poor and in a Commercial Country, they will establish an oligarchy. Take away commerce, and the democracy will triumph. Thus it has been all the world over. So it will be among us. Reason tells us we are but men, and we are not to expect any particular interference of Heaven in our favor. By thus combining and setting apart, the aristocratic interest, the popular interest will be combined against it. There will be a mutual check and mutual security.
  4. An independence for life, involves the necessary permanency. If we change our measures no body will trust us, and how avoid a change of measures, but by avoiding a change of mem Ask any man if he confides in Congress if he confides in the State of Pennsylvania if he will lend his money or enter into contract. He will tell you no. He sees no stability. He can repose no confidence. If Great Britain were to explain her refusal to treat with us, the same reasoning would be employed. He disliked the exclusion of the second branch from holding offices. It is dangerous. It is like the imprudent exclusion of the military officers during the war, from civil appointments. It deprives the Executive of the principal source of influence. If danger be apprehended from the Executive what a left-handed way is this of obviating it. If the son, the brother or the friend can be appointed, the danger may be even increased, as the disqualified father etc can then boast of a disinterestedness which he does not possess. Besides shall the best, the most able, the most virtuous citizens not be permitted to hold offices. Who then are to hold them? He was also against paying the Senators. They will pay themselves if they can. If they can not they will be rich and can do without it. Of such the second branch ought to consist, and none but such can compose it if they are not to be paid.He contended that the Executive should appoint the Senate and fill up vacancies. This gets rid of the difficulty in the present question. You may begin with any ratio you please, it will come to the same thing. The members being independent and for life, may be taken as well from one place as from another. It should be considered too how the scheme could be carried through the States. He hoped there was strength of mind enough in this House to look truth in the face. He did not hesitate therefore to say that loaves and fishes must bribe the Demogogues. They must be made to expect higher offices under the general than the State Government. A Senate for life will be a noble bait. Without such captivating prospects, the popular leaders will oppose and defeat the plan. He perceived that the first branch was to be chosen by the people of the States, the second by those chosen by the people. Is not here a Government by the States. A Government by Compact between Virginia in the first and second branch, Massachusetts in the first and second branch etc. This is going back to mere treaty. It is no Government at all. It is altogether dependent on the States, and will act over again the part which Congress has acted. A firm Government alone can protect our liberties. He fears the influence of the rich. They will have the same effect here as elsewhere if we do not by such a Government keep them within their proper sphere. We should remember that the people never act from reason alone. The Rich will take advantage of their passions and make these the instruments for oppressing them. The Result of the Contest will be a violent aristocracy, or a more violent despotism. The schemes of the Rich will be favored by the extent of the Country. The people in such distant parts can not communicate and act in concert. They will be the dupes of those who have more knowledge and intercourse. The only security against encroachments will be a select and sagacious body of men, instituted to watch against them on all sides. He meant only to hint these observations, without grounding any motion on them.