The Future- Beyond the Nixon Doctrine

From the above think it is fair to conclude that we and our Asian friends are well embarked on the effort to build a new relationship in which our role is defined by the Nixon Doctrine. I am confident that our role can be kept in consonance both with our interests and with those of the increasingly self-reliant and independent Asian states.

But that is only the first phase of the adjustments which we and others will have to make in Asia. In restructuring our own posture, we have set in train the readjustment of the whole international order in the Pacific region. For our past policies have been the heart of the general equilibrium which has been maintained for the past twenty years.

In the next decade our Asia policy will be dealing simultaneously with three phases of Asian development. In some countries there will still be an absolute-though we hope diminishing-need for us to play a central role in helping them meet their security and economic requirements. In others we will complete the process of adjusting our relationship to the concepts of the Nixon Doctrine. And with all countries we will be striving to establish a new and stable structure reflecting the renewed vigor of the smaller Asian states, the expanding hole of Japan and the changing interests of the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China. In the past twenty years the American people have sacrificed much, both in blood and treasure, to help set she stage where such a structure can be created in the Pacific region. It is now in sight.

The major elements of the emerging structure are clear. The nations of Asia acting in concert will play the key role. So will the individual policies of Japan, China, the Soviet Union and the United States. But the relationship of these elements to each other is not yet clear. They will depend largely upon decisions still to be made. I would like to discuss the more salient problems involved, and their implications for American policy.